University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1975

Justice Brennan and freedom of expression.
Richard James Del Guidice
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Del Guidice, Richard James, "Justice Brennan and freedom of expression." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations
1896 - February 2014. 1912.
https://doi.org/10.7275/zwjg-5d66 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1912

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION

A dissertation Presented
by

RICHARD

J.

DEL GUIDICE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

February 19 75

Major Subject Political Science

(c)

Richard James Del Guidice
All Rights Reserved

1975

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION

A Dissertation
by

RICHARD

J.

DEL GUIDICE

(Member)

(Month)

/

(Year)

Justice Brennan and Freedom of
Expression
February 1975

Richard

J.

Del Guidice. B.A., Drew University

M.A., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Dr.

Loren

P.

Beth

The study is an analysis of the views of
Justice

William Brennan in three kinds of free expression
cases that
have come before the Supreme Court since Brennan'
s

ment in 1957.

appoint-

The areas examined are obscenity censorship,

libel and internal security.

Justice Brennan's opinions in

each of these areas are examined.

Particular attention is

paid to his use of the balancing approach and his

viev7

of

the Supreme Court's role in protecting freedom of expression.

The study demonstrates his influence in defining the Warren

Court's position in each of the three areas examined.
As a freshman Justice, Brennan wrote the majority

opinion in Roth

v.

United States [354 U.S. 476 (1957)], the

first time the Court had squarely dealt with the constitu-

tional status of obscene expression.

From that original at-

tempt to define obscenity, Brennan's evolution to a position

rejecting such an effort is traced.

The second section of

the first chapter examines Justice Brennan's demands as to
the proper procedures to be employed if regulation of ob-

scenity is to meet the requirements of the First Amendment.
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Justice Brennan's libel opinions are
the subject of
the second chapter.
His majority opinion in N e_w York
Times
V. S ullivan [376 U.S. 254
(1964)] constitutes
one of the

important First Amendment decisions made
by the Court
and is the first libel case discussed.
Brennan's consequent
extension of the actual malice rule, established
in New York
Times is examined.

m.ore

,

While Justice Brennan's views in internal security
cases have been of less influence than his efforts
in the

first two areas examined, one of his opinions, Uphaus

v.

W^man [360 U.S. 72 (1959)] is an excellent example of
the
use of the balancing approach in free expression cases.

Brennan's balancing is compared at that point to the use of
that technique by Justice Harlan.

The concluding section of the work discusses Justice

Brennan's views on several free expression issues which do

not fit into any category.

These include the right to access

and the power of government to impose prior restraints on expression.

The study also indicates how Justice Brennan's position within the Court changed as a result of the four appoint-

ments made by President Nixon.

Brennan's shift is shown to

be particularly significant in obscenity censorship.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is designed to examine
views of freedom of
expression and its function in the American
system of
government.
During the period covered, 1956-1975,
three
types of free expression cases comprised
the bulk of the
Court's work in that area.
They were obscenity censorship,
libel and internal security.
Justice Brennan's position on
each or these issues is examined separately.

William Brennan was appointed by President Eisenhower
on September 29,

October 16.

1956, and took his seat on the Court on

A nominal Democrat, Brennan's appointment by

the Republican President followed a pattern which had been

established when Governor Driscoll, also a Republican, ap-

pointed him to the New Jersey Superior Court in 1949.

Brennan rose very rapidly after this initial service, going
to the Appellate Branch of the New Jersey Superior Court

in 1950 and,

in 1952, being appointed again by Driscoll,

the state's highest judicial body,

His elevation to the

U.

S.

to

the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court at the age

of 50 to replace the retiring Justice

^^ton

was the culmin-

ation of an impressive career of public service.
Justice Brennan's father was an Irish Catholic immi-
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grant who was a union reformer
and eventually became Newark's
Commissioner of Public Safety.
After attending high school
in Newark, Justice Brennan
entered the l^arton School of
Finance and Commerce of the
University of Pennsylvania from
which he graduated with honors.
He then entered Harvard Law
School where he served as President
of the Legal Aid Society.
Upon graduation in 1931, he joined
the Newark law firm of
Pitney, Harden and Skinner and became
a partner in
1937.

With the coming of World War II, Brennan
accepted a commission rs a major in the Army Ordinance
D2partm£nt.
After a
brief tenure in that position he was called
upon by the Air
Corps to deal with problems in the west
coast aircraft industry.

Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson then put
Brennan on his staff where he remained as a troubleshooter
for manpower problems until the war was over.

Between the

end of the war and his appointment to the New Jersey

Superior Court, Brennan was occupied with his private law
practice.

Justice Brennan 's appointment to the Supreme Court
came at the beginning of a crucial period in the history of
the Court.

The civil rights struggle was just beginning and

Americans were generally insecure because of the pressures
of the Cold War.

Both of these elements caused significant

strains on First Amendment rights.
1940

's

and early 1950

's

But during the late

the Court was dominated by a con-

servative majority that was not particularly sympathetic to
Vll

^

civil liberties claims.

By 1955, a bloc consisting
of Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas were consistently calling for greater
protection for individual freedoms.
Unlike most freshman Justices,
Brennan. upon assuming
his seat in 1956, did not take a
centrist position between
the two blocs on the Court.
Rather he very quickly alligned

himself with the activist- libertarian wing
of the Court.
By
the end of his first term of the Court
then he was part of a
group of Justices calling for a halt to
the numerous attacks

being made upon freedom of expression.
Before examining Justice Brennan'

s

views,

should

I

make clear my ovm position with respect to several of
the
free expression issues raised herein.
It is my view that freedom of expression plays the

most important role in establishing the character of the

American system.

Most essentially it provides a means where-

by the citizenry can participate in the governing of the
nation.

But more broadly, a vigorous system of freedom of

expression plays a critical role in the evolution of society
in general.

The free interchange of ideas encouraged by a

liberal reading of the First Amendment's protection of ex-

pression is necessary if social values are not to become
stagnant

While

I

view freedom of expression thusly,

I

do not

favor an absolute or literal reading of the First Amendment.
To my mind the absolutist approach is unwise for the most
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obvious reason: There are some
instances in which expression
should be restricted.
If it could be clearly
shown, for example, that failing to limit
expression would lead to violence then that particular
expression should be limited in
that particular context.
Secondly, a wiser approach in
dealing with free expression issues
seems to me to be the
balancing approach as employed by Justice
Brennan.
As we
shall see. Brennan requires clear and
convincing evidence that
the interest asserted in opposition to
expression
is first,

a valid interest and,

second, one that could not be pursued

by any means other than a limitation of expression.
I

Further,

am of the view that the Supreme Court bears
the primary re-

sponsibility for striking this balance.

In short,

I

view the

Court as the most important protector of free expression.

Overall then,

I

concur in Justice Brennan'

s

reading of

the First Amendment and his view of the Court's role in pro-

tecting freedom of expression.

The points at which my views

diverge from his are indicated in the text below.

ix

CHAPTER

I

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND OBSCENITY
CENSORSHIP

Obscenity censorship is clearly the most
difficult
free speech issue vzith which the
Court has dealt during
Justice Brennan's tenure.
The obvious problem of arriving
at a definition of the obscene has
rendered more complex
other disagreements within the Court as to
the constitutional status of obscenity, the procedural aspects
of cen-

sorship and the relative powers of the state and
federal

governments to censor.

Justice Brennan has played a major role in developing the Court's position.

Since 1957, the Court has handed

down 33 written opinions in obscenity cases.

Until 1968,

Justice Brennan wrote more majority or plurality opinions
than any other member of the Court --in eleven of the

eighteen cases decided to that point.

After 1968, and due

in part to the changes which occurred in the makeup of the

Court, Justice Brennan became one of the more frequent dis-

senters,

dissenting in eight of the fifteen cases decided

between 1968 and the end of the 1972-1973 term.

Wnile this

pattern reflects to a great extent the impact of the four
Nixon appointees, it is also a result of a significant
change in Justice Brennan's views of the obscenity

censorship issue.

As we shall see, he has
rejected the rule

for which he was primarily
responsible.^

This chapter will be organized
as follows.

The first

section deals with Justice Brennan's
attempts to define obscenity.
This will be followed by an examination
of the pro
cedures he would require if censorship of
the obscene is
to

escape constitutional infirmity.

In June of 1973,

handed down seven obscenity decisions,

Brennan dissented.

^

the Court

and in each Justice

The views expressed in those dissents

mark a substantial shift in his position and warrant
very
close examination.
Consequently, the section dealing with
procedure will be followed by an analysis of Brennan's
new
position and the change effected in obscenity law by the
Court majority.

As will be seen. Justice Brennan has come

t

reject both his own early views and the Court's new stance.

Defining the Obscene
Barely six months after his appointment to the Court,

Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion in Roth

United States

3
.

v.

This became the leading case in obscenity

censorship, since the Court had never previously dealt

squarely with the constitutional status of obscene expression.

4

The case involved an appeal from a conviction under

the federal obscenity law which prohibits the use of the

mails for the distribution of obscene materials.^
But Justice Brennan ignored the question of whether
the challenged materials were in fact obscene.

He discussed

3

instead whether obscene expression
in general was afforded
protection by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
It was
clear, he felt, that that protection
was not absolute.
There were some forms of expression
which could properly be
limited.
While the First Amendment protects some
distasteful expression, it does so only
when and because that par-

ticular expression stimulates the
interchange of ideas.
But for Brennan obscene expression
contributed nothing to an
exchange of views: it was "utterly without
redeeming social
importance." Consequently, it was outside the
protection of
the First Amendment.
That view was confirmed, he said, by
various Supreme Court dicta and the fact that every
state
and the federal government had legislated against obscene

expression.

Since obscene expression in general was out-

side constitutional protection, Brennan felt it was unneces-

sary to ask whether a specific instance of obscenity created
a clear and present danger.

By fiat then. Justice Brennan condemned obscene ex-

pression to the lower level of what Kalven calls the "twolevel-free-speech- theory. "^

Obscenity was grouped with ex-

pression so harmful by its very utterance that no consideration need be given to the circumstances surrounding its use.

Generally, Justice Brennan believes that in each
case in which expression is challenged, a judge must balance
the value of that particular expression against the value

of those interests affected by it.

But,

of course, here,

in obscenity, he explicitly
rejects that approach.

The apparent reason for this tactic is
the fact that one does not know
what interest, if any, is being
affected by the use of obscene
expression.
Even now, seventeen years after
Roth, it is still

unclear as to whether exposure to obscene
expression leads to
anti-social behavior or has broader harmful
consequences
to

society.

So Justice Brennan did not have clear
evidence either

that obscenity was harmful or harmless.

Consequently, he, in

effect, fell back on a view which ultimately
reduces to this:
since obscenity has been universally condemned as
lacking in

social value, it is therefore unprotected.

But again,

that is

not at all an accurate reflection of the value he
places on

freedom of expression.

As will be made clear, he is not one

of those who would submit the First Amendment to popular
referendum.

He simply felt he had little other choice given the

uncertainty of the empirical evidence as to the effects of obscenity.

Further, it is important to keep in mind that Brennan'

declaration that obscenity is unprotected is of little practical consequence without a definition of what constitutes
the obscene.
test.*^

At one time American courts used the Hicklin

That standard permitted the evaluation of allegedly

obscene material on the basis of its likely impact on the

person most susceptible to it.

Further, isolated passages

of a work could render the entire work obscene.

Brennan'

s

Justice

Roth test, as it became known, sought to overcome

the defects of the Hicklin formula.

When evaluating whether

material is obscene, the test to
be applied was
.. .whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards,
nant theme of the material taken asthe domi-^
a whole
appeals to prurient interest.
As Justice Brennan himself later
recognized,^ the Roth test
is not without problems, but any
substitute would also be Linperfect.
There is simply no way to define precisely
what is

essentially a value judgment.

But Justice Brennan later fre-

quently attempted to explain what he meant by
the Roth definition, and, in so doing, modified that standard.

Seven years after first announcing the Roth test,
Justice Brennan sought to clarify it.^°
he said,

if it was patently offensive,

had employed in the Manual Enterprises
it was unprotected because it was,

A work was obscene,
a term Justice Harlan
case.-^-*-

If obscene,

as he said in Roth

"utterly without redeeming social importance."

,

Justice

Brennan uses the social value test as the dividing line between protected speech and unprotected obscenity.

His in-

sistence that a work be "utterly" devoid of value reflects
his concern that serious literary and/or scientific work

which is erotic and perhaps esoteric could be judged obscene
if its value, albeit limited, were not taken into account.
In short, what he has consistently attempted to do is to

provide the broadest possible freedom for expression while
at the same time leaving the door open for limiting expres-

sion he deems valueless.

The difficulty with the social

value test, however, is that it is not the kind of "sensitive

tool" Brennan recognizes as
necessary
.to separate obscenity from
other sexually oriented but constitutionally
protected speech, so that efforts to
suppress
the former do not spill over into
the suppression of the latter. ^2
.

.

And again, it is probably not possible
to devise such
given the inherent nature of obscenity.

a tool

At the same time that Justice Brennan was
stressing
the importance of social value as a guide
in obscenity censorship, he made a significant change in what
social importance

represented.

In the Roth case, Brennan had held that
ob-

scenity was unprotected because it lacked redeeming
social
importance-- that lack of value was a characteristic of
the obscene.

But in his first major reinterpretation of Roth

seven years later, social value becomes a measure of whether

material is in fact obscene.

And so he states

Nor may the constitutional status of the
material be made to turn on a 'weighing'
of its social importance against its
prurient appeal, for a work cannot be
proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social importance.-'-^
This means then that a work may be patently offensive and

possess a prurient appeal, but still not be obscene if it
has some social value.

Justice Brennan made this point even

more clearly in the Memoirs
to refine the Roth test.

case'^'^

where he again attempted

In Memoirs he expressed the view

that Roth required the 'coalescing' of three elements before
a work may be judged obscene.

it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole

appeals to prurient interest
in sex;
(b) the material is
patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary
munity standards relating to the comdescription or representation of
sexual
matters; and (c) the material
is
without redeeming social value. 15 utterly
For Brennan, each of the three
tests must be applied independently and not balanced one against
the other.
Again
here he stressed that the challenged
work must be utterly
lacking in social importance before
it can be suppressed.
That was in fact the reason the
Massachusetts ban on Memoirs
was rejected by Brennan; the state
high court had ruled that
the book was obscene even though it did
possess some social
value.
So up to this point at least, the
social importance
standard was the major underpinning of Brennan'
s obscenity
test, and as he frequently stated,

relaxed.

it was in no case to be

In short, material had to be "utterly," totally,

devoid of value before it could be censored.
But on the very same day he rejected a state court

judgment of Memoirs as obscene because it was based on a relaxation of the social value test, he himself grafted an exception onto that standard."'"^
That exception was an element originally suggested by

Chief Justice Warren in his Roth opinion.
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture.
The nature of the materials is,
of course, relevant as an attribute of the
defendant's conduct, but the materials are
thus placed in a context from which they
draw color and character. 1^
They [the defendants] were plainly
.

.

.

engaged in the commercial exploitation
of
the morbxd and shameful craving
for materials wxth prurient effect.
I believe that
the State and Federal Governments
can
stitutionally punish such conduct. 18 con-

Justice Brennan called this kind of
conduct pandering, and
so labelled the actions of Ralph
Ginzburg, publisher
of

several works banned from the mails.

The circumstances

which led Brennan to the conclusion that
Ginzburg had
pandered were several.
The publisher had tried

to obtain

mailing permits from first Blue Ball, and then
Intercourse,
Pennsylvania.
Failing at both stations because of

their in-

ability to handle such a large amount of material,
Ginzburg
did all his mailing from Middlesex, New Jersey.

Further the

advertisements for the materials carried the assurance that
in the event of Post Office censorship, the full purchase

price would be refunded to the buyer.

Justice Brennan felt

that all of this was an attempt to further the materials

"salacious appeal" and for him

"...

where the purveyor's

sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his

publications that fact may be decisive in the determination
of obscenity."

1

Q

Of course, none of this spoke to the content of the

three challenged works; Eros

Selective Promiscuity
ceded,

,

,

The Housewife's Handbook of

and Liaison

.

Justice Brennan con-

at least in the case of the first two, that each may

have possessed some limited social value.

And because the

value was only limited, the "fact" that the seller had

pandered rendered the works obscene.

9

Several points must be made here.
portant. Justice Brennan did in

First, and most im-

fact in this case relax the

social value test.

After 1966, and despite Brennan'

s

dis-

claimers, a book needed no longer to
be "utterly without redeeming social importance" before it
might be declared obscene in a particular situation. Brennan
claims this is not
so, that all the Court does when
it declares a pandered work
of limited social value obscene is to
accept the purveyor's

judgment as to the nature of his wares.

But. regardless of

whose judgment is being accepted, the fact remains
that the
effect of Brennan' s position here is to permit the
cen-

soring of works possessing some social value.

But there is

a distinction to be made here x^rhich 1 think
explains this

seeming inconsistency.

In confronting the Ginzburg case,

Justice Brennan dealt with two elements; the challenged

materials and the actions of the seller.

Brennan conceded

that the works in question possessed some social value.

Consequently, standing alone they could not be obscene,
they were not utterly lacking in value and could not therefore be censored.

But of course they were not standing

Justice Brennan obviously disapproved of Ginzburg'

alone.

"sordid business" and consequently sought to punish him.
The materials then became, in a sense, the somewhat innocent

victims of their promoter.

What Brennan had done, in short,

was to punish Ginzburg for pandering.
Eros

,

et

.

al.

,

obscene in all contexts.

He did not declare

But promoted in

10

the fashion Ginzburg employed,

they became, in that context,

obscene.

Further, by allowing Ginzburg's
fine and jail sentence to stand, the Court's
decision had the practical consequence of censoring the cited works.
Secondly, Justi,-ce
Brennan's reliance on pandering as
an element in his obscenity calculus is simply a recasting
of the prurient appeal
facet of the Roth test.
In the Memoirs case, Brennan re-

quired a conjoining of prurient appeal,
patent offensiveness and utter lack of social importance
before a work could
be held obscene.
But, in Ginzburg the nature
of the appeal

.

becomes determinative in spite of the fact
that patent offensiveness is not demonstrated, nor even discussed,

and the

challenged works are admitted to possess some social
value.
In short, what was at one time one third of the
obscenity

test becomes for Brennan the sole determining standard
in

what he calls "close cases" wherein
value and has been pandered.

a

work is of limited

And that standard is employed

as a measure of the purveyor's actions and not as a test of
a book's contents.

Justice Brennan's use of the pandering test is an

adaptation of a concept called "variable obscenity" discussed most fully by Lockhard and McClure.^"^

As they ex-

plain it, this concept assumes that no material is in-

herently obscene but that obscenity varies with the circumstances of its distribution.

A judge would evaluate chal-

lenged material in light of its appeal to and effect on the

11

audience to which it was primarily
directed.
If the circumstances indicated that the appeal
was prurient and was aimed
at the lustful interests of
the average person in the intended audience, then the work would
be judged obscene.
This approach has one great virtue:

it is a far

simpler approach to the question of
obscenity than the rather
thankless task of evaluating a work's
content in an effort
to determine whether it is obscene.
Surely, a judge could
more easily evaluate a purveyor's intent
than that of a
writer.
But while it offers less complexity in
application,
the concept of variable obscenity has two very
serious
flaws.

As Justice Douglas indicated in his Memoirs
concurrence^^
and his Ginzburg dissent,

the nature of an advertisement

has little to do with the quality of the product
advertised.

Would a lewd advertisement offering the Bible for sale thereby render it obscene?

0/

In short, the variable obscenity ap-

proach and Brennan's use of it would have one believe, as it
were, that you can tell an obscene book by its cover.

The

second problem with Brennan's use of variable obscenity in

Ginzbur g was also pointed out in a dissent, that of Justice
Black.

Ginzburg is, as I see it, having his conviction affirmed upon the basis of a statute
amended by this Court for violation of which
amended statute he was not charged in the
courts below.
Such an affirmance we have
said violates due process.
What Black is saying here is simply that there is no law
against pandering, the determinative factor in Brennan's

12

decision.

Ginzburg was charged with using
the mails to distribute obscene materials.
The materials themselves were
not found obscene but became so
because of Ginzburg'
actions, which actions, again, were
not illegal, at least
not before Justice Brennan's decision.
Justice Brennan again employed variable
obscenity in
a case involving materials
designed for deviant sexual
groups. 27

The publisher of the materials, Edward
Mishkin,

claimed that the materials could not be held
obscene since
they did not appeal to the prurient interest
of the average
person.
Since the material was designed for deviant
sexual
groups, he claimed it would disgust the average
person of
the Roth test.
In short,

the contention here was that Roth had im-

posed an inelastic standard that did not vary at all,

in

part this argument reflects a dependence on Justice

Brennan's Jacobellis
I

2

°

opinion in which he so emphatically

stressed that the components of Roth could not be "weighed."
Of course, Brennan himself had in fact done precisely that
in the Ginzburg case.

Consistent with Ginzbur g
argument.

,

Brennan rejected Mishkin'

He said that the average person concept of Roth

had been employed simply to counteract the most susceptible

person facet of the Hicklin test.
Where the material is designed for an primarily disseminated to a clearly defined
deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement

13

of the Roth test is satisfied
if the
dominant theme of the material
taken as
a whole appeals to the
prurient interest
in sex of tne members of that
group. 29

In short,

if the circumstances surrounding
the production of

challenged material indicated that it
was designed to appeal
to a particular group, then the
average person in that group
became the average person under Roth.^^
What this meant
then was that a judge attempting to
evaluate whether material
was obscene must conduct a process
which may be characterized as follows.
He must first establish what group constitutes the primary intended audience.
Then he must decide
whether the material has prurient appeal to the
average person in that group.
This 1966 trilogy of cases

x^as

the last time Justice

Brennan dealt with defining obscenity until the Miller^^ and
Slaton 32 cases which will be discussed separately below.

After nine years of struggling with the Roth definition
then. Justice Brennan had arrived at a standard which may be

restated as follows:

A work is obscene when to the average person
in the intended primary audience, applying
the contemporary national community standards 34 of that audience, the dominant
theme of the work taken as a whole is characterized by a conjoining of prurient appeal,
patent of f ensiveness and utter lack of redeeming social importance.
If a work is of
limited social importance and the purveyor
has pandered it, he may be punished for distributing obscene material,
,

I

think it unnecessary to further criticize this

rule, at least at this point.

The best attack on it came

14

from Justice Brennan himself
in his Slaton opinion.
As he
there recognizes, his attempts
at defining the obscene were
in fact futile and did not
provide the protection for nonobscene expression that he sought.
Again, it was not
a

matter of Justice Brennan failing to
fashion the proper
standard that lead to the confused state
of obscenity law,
but rather the nature of the problem
itself.
/Justice Brennan'

s

general approach to the problem of

defining obscenity is indicative of his desire
to provide
broad protection for freedom of expression,
mat he has
done has been to state, first, that obscenity is
unprotected

by the First Amendment.

Standing alone, that view would ap-

pear to be inimical to free speech interests.

But his at-

tempts to define "obscene" and his application of that defi-

nition to challenged materials make it clear that his goal
is to provide very broad protection for sexually oriented

material.

It is important to keep in mind that Justice

Brennan did not find any of the materials before the Court
obscene in and of themselves.

It is true that Eros and

Mishkin's materials were suppressed but, again, that was
simply a consequence of the primary motive of Brennan'
in those cases,

s

view

i.e ., to punish those who had pandered.

In

practical terms, that distinction nay not be terribly significant.

But to Justice Brennan, it is a crucial one.
Brennan'

s

commitment to a vigorous system of free ex-

pression is even more clearly demonstrated by his view of

15

the procedures required if
censorship is to escape constitutional infirmity. As we shall
now see, his goal here is
the same as it was in his efforts
to define: to insure that
the non-obscene is not condemned
along with the obscene.

Given the fact that Justice Brennan
feels that obscene expression is unprotected, the
procedures he requires
of potential censors are critical
in helping to define his
commitment to freedom of expression.
Clearly, were he to
permit wide latitude, to allow censors to
adopt any convenient procedure, the First Amendment would
thereby suffer.
But as we shall see below. Justice Brennan
would in fact allow little variation in the procedures employed
to suppress
the obscene.

./Justice Brennan'

s

major concern in dealing with cen-

sorship procedures is to insure that protected expression is

not suppressed along with the obscene.

In his words, the

censor is required to employ "sensitive tools."

Attempting

to provide such aids. Justice Brennan has dealt primarily

with two major aspects of the procedure issue: the status of
prior restraint of expression and the role to be played by
the judicial process.

His opinion in the Marcus case^^

exemplifies this approach.
The procedure employed in that case was initiated by
the filing of a sworn complaint by a police officer "posi-

tively" stating that obscene material was being kept.

The

judge receiving the complaint v/ould then issue a warrant.
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directed to any peace officer, to seize
the cited material.
Once the police had accomplished the
seizure, the judge was
to set a date not less than
5 nor more than 20 days after
seizure for a trial to determine whether
the material

was in

fact obscene.

State law did not establish any time
limit

within which a decision had to be reached on
that issue.
Justice Brennan found the procedure defective

for

several reasons.

The initial complaint was itself defective

in that it was too general.

Citation of the specific x^orks

to be seized was not required,

state law permitting a warrant

to issue upon a complaint against "obscene materials."

warrant also did not cite particular materials.

The

Further,

judges were not required to render a decision as to whether
the material was obscene within any specified time limit.

But Justice Brennan 's major objection to Missouri procedure

was that the judge never saw the cited materials prior to

issuing the warrant for seizure.

In short, a restraint was

imposed prior to an adversary hearing.

Justice Brennan sees an adversary hearing as a critical safeguard for protected expression.

The censor's busi-

ness is to censor and consequently
there inheres the danger that he may well be
less responsive than a court--part of an independent branch of government --to the constitutionally protected interests in free
expression 37
.

Furthermore, Brennan would require the courts to act as a

check prior to the imposition of an extensive restraint.

Justice Brennan does not condemn all prior restraint.

38

In Marcus he makes it clear
that a restraint may be
imposed
prior to an adversary hearing.
But that restraint must be

brief:

under the precedent he cites ^9
^hree days between
the issuance of a £ente^ lite
injunction and a decision on
the issue.
In short, a work can be temporarily
restrained
but only for a brief period while a
trial is held to determine if it is obscene and will therefore
be permanently
,

re-

strained.

Justice Brennan spoke more directly to
the prior restraint issue in Freedman v. Maryland
This was also the
opinion in which he provided the most precise
statement of
.

the procedures he requires if censorship of the
obscene is
to be permissible.

As was the case in Times Film, ^"^

Freedman involved the refusal of an official board of censors to license the exhibition of a film^^ unless it was

first submitted to them.

Justice Brennan pointed out that

like all forms of prior restraint, this particular method

carried a presumption against its constitutionality.

If

such procedures were to escape constitutional infirmity.

Justice Brennan would require that they incorporate the

following minimal standards:
1.

The burden of proof must rest upon the
censor to establish that the film is obscene.
In short, all films are assumed
not obscene, protected, until proven
otherwise

2.

The states may employ a prior restraint
to bar exhibition of a film temporarily
but a final restraint cannot be imposed
until a judicial decision has been reached
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that the film is in fact
obscene.
3.

Either the state courts or state
law
must require the censor either
to license
the film or go to court to
restrain it
withm a specified period.

4.

Any restraint prior to judicial
determination ot the issues must be as brief
as
possible

5.

State procedure must provide for "Prompt
final judicial decision."

Again, these procedures emphasize that
Justice Brennan views
any proper scheme of censorship as basically
a judicial procedure.

While censors working under the aegis of an
admini-

strative agency may impose a brief restraint, it
is only to
provide them with time to bring the issue before a
judge.

The final, permanent restraint can only result from the
de-

cision of a court.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the Slaton and

Miller cases and the changes in Brennan'
in,

s

note must be taken of two cases in which Justice Brennan

joined Justice White's majority opinions.
1

view evident there-

think,

'^^

Those two votes,

illuminate an important facet of Justice Brennan'

approach in obscenity censorship.
Both cases involved the majority's rejection of what

might have seemed to be logical extensions of Stanley
Georgia 45
.

v.

The majority in Stanley had held that mere pri-

vate possession of obscene materials, in one's home, could
not constitutionally be made a crime.

Justice Brennan had

not been part of the Stanley majority, joining instead
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Justice Stewart's concurrence.

Stewart felt that Stanley 's

conviction should have been voided on
Fourth Amendment
grounds:
the allegedly obscene films were
seized by poli,-ce
acting under a warrant permitting
them to search for

gambling materials.

But five members of the Court had
felt
that the determinative issue was the "...
right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth.
the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy. "^^

Obviously, if this right to possess any material
in
one's home is to be anything but empty words, one
must be

able to obtain it somewhere, someone must sell it to him.
But Justice

Stanley

,

l^Jhite,

who also had joined Stewart's concurrence

felt quite differently.

In the Reidel case.

White held that
To extrapolate from Stanley's right to have
and peruse obscene material in the privacy of
his own home a First Amendment right in Reidel
to sell it to him would effectively scuttle
Roth, the precise result that the Stanley opinion abjured.
Whatever the scope of the right
to receive" referred to in Stanley, it is not
so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here--dealings that
Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment.
Again, in U.

S.

v.

37 Photos

from the Stanley decision.

,

White refused to "extrapolate"

But here the claimed extension

of that case was the right to import obscene pictures for

private and possible commercial use.
It seems to me that Justice Brennan's joining in

these opinions reflects what is,

I

think, his sore point in
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obscenity questions.

While he would impose severe
limitations on censors by requiring
precise procedures
,

and re-

quire a Solomon-like understanding
of and concurrence with
his definition of the obscene,
he has demonstrated a total
lack of patience with some sellers
of obscene material.

In

that sense his vote in these two
cases completes the pattern
begun in his Ginzburg opinion. There as a
result of his desire to punish Ginzburg, he permitted
material to be judged
obscene even though it did not fulfill all of
the requirements of his own definition of obscene. And
by joining in

these two majorities he participates in a result
which

Justice Black concludes means that a man may possess
obscene
material as long as he "
writes salacious books
.

.

in his

.

attic, prints them in his basement and reads them in
his

living room."
think it is this sort of illogic which finally led

I

Justice Brennan to reject all he had fashioned in 16 years
of toiling with obscenity censorship.
Brennan'

s

But more importantly,

rather remarkable shift in Slaton was a product of

his concern that the illogic was damaging to freedom of ex-

pression.

In that sense then his Slaton views are his at-

tempt to begin again to regulate obscenity while at the same
time providing the broadest possible protection for what he
viex<7S

as the most critical of the Bill of Rights.

Miller

v.

California ^^ and Paris Adult Theater

Slaton^'^ will be treated here as one case.

v.

The discussion

of Chief Justice Burger's views will focus
on three major
issues:

the social value test; his use of the balancing
ap-

proach; and the obscenity standard he produced.

That will

be followed by an analysis of Justice Brennan's dissent
and
an evaluation of the views contained therein.

The social value test was the nucleus of Justice

Brennan's approach to obscenity and its status with respect
to the First Amendment.

Initially in Roth,^^ he had held

obscenity unprotected because it lacked redeeming social imBut then in Jacobell is ^-^ and later in Memoirs ^^

portance.

he had employed social value as a measure of whether a work

was obscene rather than as a characteristic of obscenity.

Chief Justice Burger viewed that shift as a "sharp departure" from Roth

.

The fact that prosecutors would have to

prove that a work was "utterly lacking in redeeming social

importance" meant, he said, that virtually nothing could be

proved obscene. 55

Consequently, Burger rejected the social

value test as both impossible to meet and ambiguous.
place,

In its

the Chief Justice substituted the following:

At a minimum, prurient patently offensive
depiction or description of sexual conduct
must have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value to merit First
Amendment protection.-'
,

One might call this the "serious value" test.

Of course,

it is no less ambiguous than the social value rule and is

in fact simply a rephrasing of the earlier formulation.
J acobellis ^
,

.

.

.

Justice Brennan wrote

material dealing with sex in a manner

In

22

that advocates ideas.
.or that has
literary or scientific or artistic
value
°^li^n^-Qther_fo rTn of social i mportanrp
.

nied the constitutional protection. 58
In short. Burger's changing
of social value to serious value

accomplishes nothing positive.

The ambiguity remains as

does the need to prove that a work
possesses no serious

value before it may be declared obscene.

^NThat

the change

does accomplish is to further
obfuscate the already muddled
state of obscenity law by giving the
appearance of change

while not changing at all.^^
As pointed out earlier,

Justice Brennan did not em-

ploy the balancing approach in the obscenity
cases.

I

am of

the opinion that this was due to the fact that
it was, and
is,

too unclear as to what interests obscenity
effects.

But that lack of certainty did not bother the Chief
Justice.

6

Most generally, a state can censor obscenity

under its "broad power to regulate commerce and protect the
public environment."

More specifically he argued that

... there are legitimate state interests
at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity.
.These include the
interest of the public in the quality of
life and the total community environment,
the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and, possibly, the public safety
itself.
The Hill-Link Minority Report of
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
indicates that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material
and crime. ^2
.

.

It is clear from the tone of Burger's opinion that the most

important interest he feels is being protected by censorship
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of obscenity is the public
safety.

He does not explicitly

state that obscenity leads to
anti-social behavior but is
prepared to permit regulation on
the "assumption" that exposure to the obscene has "a
tendency to exert a corrupting
and debasing impact leading to
antisocial behavior." But of
course the majority report of the
Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography concludes that
empirical research into the
connection between obscenity and antisocial
behavior has
failed to turn up any evidence demonstrating
a causal rela63
tionship.
Chief Justice Burger however would permit
state
legislatures to "reasonably" determine that
exposure to ob-

scenity might lead to antisocial conduct and
upon that
basis, regulate expression.
This is what

I

find to be one of the more objection-

able features of the Burger view.

What he permits here is

the sacrifice of freedom of expression on the mere possi-

bility that it might cause anti-social behavior.

His view

that limitation of expression may be properly based on an

assumption that it has a "tendency" to debase and corrupt is
a retreat to the vagaries of the Hicklin test.

It demon-

strates what is at best a very casual commitment to freedom
of expression.

The Chief Justice claims that it is not for

the Court to settle the empirical uncertainties concerning
the effects of exposure to obscenity.

But of course, his

opinions have precisely that effect in that lawmakers are

now free to limit obscenity because it might lead to antisocial conduct.
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Chief Justice Burger views
this state power as
limited to regulation of depictions
or descriptions of sex
that are obscene.
The rule he provides as the
test of a
work's obscenity is very much a
rephrasing of the Roth test.
(a) whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find
that thework, taken as a whole,
appeals to
interest,
(b) whether the
wn^v^S'"''-^^^
work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and
(c)
whether the work taken as a whole lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
.

.

.

Basically of course this is Brennan's Memoirs
formulation
with the above discussed substitution of the
"serious" value
for "social" value.
But Burger does make several
signifi-

cant additions to the earlier test.

First of all, he would re-

quire the states to specifically define the sexual conduct

whose description can be limited.

He suggests that these might

include patently offensive depictions of

".

.

.

acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.

ultimate sex
.

.

of mastur-

bation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 66

It should be pointed out that the Chief Justice

is attempting to require some precision of obscenity law so

that First Amendment interests are damaged as little as possible.

But obviously, no law which requires that the de-

pictions be "patently offensive" or "lewd" or "perverted" is

very precise at all.

Again, this area, obscenity, cannot be

clearly and unambiguously defined.

Further,

it is difficult

to conceive how legislatures can formulate statutes that
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will specifically describe
the acts subject to limitation.
Either the law will be vague,
as is the example given
by the
Chief Justice, or they will be
so specific as to become
easily evaded by those with
imagination.
Burger's second major change in
the Memoi rs formulation concerns the community standards
to which he refers.
In Justice Brennan's hands, the
community was national in
character.
But as Burger correctly indicates, that
was
never a majority view. For him, reliance
on national
standards is too hypothetical.
But local juries can reflect
a state standard in determining what
appeals to prurience
and is patently offensive. The Chief Justice
feels that

Under a national Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations on the
pox^7ers of the states do not vary from community to community, but this does not
mean that there are, or should or can be
fixed, uniform national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently of f ensive °
.

'

This facet of Burger's approach is at best extremely

puzzling.

I

simply fail to see how both a uniform First

Amendment and state determination of obscenity standards can
coexist.

When a jury decides what expression is obscene and

therefore to be limited, it is at the same time determining the scope of the First Amendment.

The Chief Justice in-

dicates that different states will have different views as
to what is obscene, and he is surely correct.

That will mean

that the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment

will likewise vary.

Burger says that free expression inter-
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ests will be protected by the
power of state appellate
courts to review the findings
of local courts.
So in the
final analysis it is the state
appellate courts which will

determine obscenity standards and
the extent of the First
Amendment's protection of sexually
oriented material within
each state. 68 That is precisely
the approach for which
Justice Harlan so long argued.
It is too early to determine
accurately the practical

consequences of this Balkanization of the
First Amendment.
But there are several possibilities. Movie
producers and
book publishers may very well have to release
several different versions of a film or book, each version
keyed to a

particular state or group of states notion of what is
not
obscene.
If that is economically unfeasible, and it may
well be, the only other alternative is self-censorship
in
the form of producing a single version of a work inoffensive

enough to escape limitation in the most sensitive state.
short,

In

the media may well be reduced to observing the

Hicklin test; to producing only that material which will
not offend the most susceptible community.

All in all, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in the

Miller and Slaton cases seems to me to be
step backward.

a

considerable

His views do nothing to clarify the very

muddled condition of obscenity law and in fact add greatly
to it by permitting the development of a multitude of ob-

scenity standards.

Further, there can be no doubt that his
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approach will generate a large
number of cases with which
appellate courts will have to deal
as the system attempts to
determine precisely what the "new"
law of obscenity means.
One consequence of that approach
is clear; the protection
afforded sexually oriented expression
has been considerably
reduced.
In rejecting the majority view in
Slaton and Miller

.

Justice Brennan also rejected his own
substantial efforts to
deal with the obscenity issue.
His major objection to both
approaches x^as that they were intolerably vague and
conse-

quently did not provide the "sensitive tools" required
to

distinguish between protected and unprotected expression.
after 16 years of experimentation and
debate I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion
that none of the available formulas, including
the one announced today, can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level while at the same time
striking an acceptable balance between the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
on the one hand, and on the other the asserted
state interest in regulating the dissemination
of certain sexually oriented materials. Any
effort to draw a constitutionally accep'table boundary
on state power must resort to such indefinite
concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like.
The meaning of these concepts varies with the
experience, outlook and even idios3rncracies of
the person defining them.
Although we have assumed that obscenity does exist and that we
'know it V7hen [we] see it,' ... we are
manifestly unable to describe it in advance
except by reference to concepts so elusive
that they fail to distinguish clearly between
protected and unprotected speech.''^
.

.

.

Brennan stated that in addition to the failure adequately to
separate protected expression from the obscene, the vagueness
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inherent in the Court's approach
to obscenity censorship
had
produced several other problems.
Lack of precision in the
law meant that there was no fair
notice of exactly what was
prohibited.
This in turn lead to arbitrary
enforcement.
Further, "institutional stress" was
created since lox^er
federal and state courts "... cannot
say with certainty
that material is obscene until at least
five members of this
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced
it so."''^

Justice Brennan felt that the Slaton - Miller
approach
not only failed to clear up any of these problems
but also

contributed several of its own.

Chief Justice Burger's for-

mulation, which Brennan labelled the "physical conduct"
test, was only a slight variation from the Roth formula.
is premised on the view,

as was Roth,

It

that there exists an

identifiable class of speech which can be limited consistent

with the First Amendment.
test,

But in rejecting the social value

the Chief Justice rejected the "key basis" of Roth

The Court's approach necessarily assumes that
some works will be deemed obscene--even though
they clearly have some social value- -because
the State was able to prove that the value,
measured by some unspecified standard, was not
sufficiently 'serious' to warrant constitutional protection.
That result is not merely
inconsistent with our holding in Roth; it is
nothing less than a rejection of the fundamental First Amendment premises and rationale
of the Roth opinion and an invitation to widespread suppression of sexually oriented speech.
Before today, the protections of the First
Amendment have never been thought limited to
expressions of serious literary or political
value ''2
.

:

29

In short, Justice Brennan
i.eeis ^hp^
feels
.
.
that m.^
the approach
of the
Slaton majority will
in<?n-ro t-u^
y wxxi insure
the censorship of protected
.

•,

.

works
It is because of that
conclusion that Justice Brennan
bases his new approach on the
view that
outright sup.

.

pression of obscenity cannot
be reconciled with the fundamental principles of the First
and Fourteenth Amendment. "^^
But this does not mean that
he would leave the states
totally powerless to regulate
sexually oriented material.
The state has a proper interest
in protecting juveniles and
unconsenting adults from exposure to
sexually oriented
materials.

What Justice Brennan has done here is.
in a sense, a
logical extension of his approach in
Ginzburg
In
.

that case,

his emphasis was not on the content of
the challenged works
but rather on the manner in which they were
advertised and
distributed.
In Slaton he goes even further in that
direction.

Because he demands precision in any law effecting

free expression and because that degree of precision
simply

can't be attained with respect to obscenity without
serious

damage to the First Amendment, he has decided to attack
the

obscenity problem from another direction.

The scheme he

° can be outlined as
V70uld seem to favor 7 6
follows.

States and the federal government would be stripped
of any power to regulate the content of expression on the

basis of its alleged obscenity.

But government would be
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free to control the way material
is sold and distributed
so
as to protect minors and
unwilling adults from being
exposed
to possibly offensive
material.
Brennan accepts the
Stanlei,^^ ruling that the
"Constitution protects the right
to receive information and
ideas" even if they are obscene.
That right, he feels, is closely
related to several others:
the right to privacy from unwarranted
government intrusion
into personal matters, and in
general; and the right to the
free control over the development of
one's personality.
He
then reasons

that the recognition of these intertwining rights calls in question the
validity of the two- level approach recognized in Roth. After all, if a person
has the right to receive information without regard to its social worth--that is
without regard to its obscenity-- then it
would seem to follow that a State could
not constitutionally punish one who undertakes to provide this information to a
willing adult lecip^nt 78
.

In short, no speech is a priori unprotected because
of its

content.

But it may be regulated if it intrudes on juveniles

or unwilling adults.

Again, to extrapolate further, the

practical system implied by this approach might permit laws

which forbid, for instance, marquee displays advertising
sexually oriented movie.

a

The movie itself could not properly

be limited regardless of its content, as long as it gave

clear warning to those who entered as to its exact nature.
But if a passerby could not avoid being confronted with

scenes from the film, the theater could be held liable for
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that kind of advertising.

What this approach contemplates

then is "obscenity" law based
totally on the concept of
pandering as discussed in Ginzburg
.

That is precisely the system
adopted by the Oregon
legislature when it passed a revised
Criminal Code in 1971.
Part of the new code is an obscenity
law patterned after
that recommended by Richard Kuh in
his book, Foolish
li&le^ivesj

Law

Pornogra2h^^_in^d-o ut of Court

.

The Oregon

prohibits furnishing obscene materials
to minors

(Sect.

256);

(sect.

261).

sending obscene materials to minors
(sect. 258);
displaying obscene materials to minors (sect.
259); and publicly displaying nudity or sex for advertising
purposes

following:

The law defines obscenity as any one of the
nudity; "slang words currently generally re-

jected for regular use in mixed society;" sado-masochistic
abuse;

sexual conduct; or sexual excitement.

terms is in defined with,

I

Each of these

think, a good deal of precision.

For example, nudity, is defined as
uncovered, or less than opaquely covered,
post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas,
the post-pubertal human female breast below a point immediately above the top of
the areola, or the covered human male genitals in a discernably turgid state.
For
purposes of this definition, a female
breast is considered uncovered if the
nipple only or the nipple and the areola
only are covered."^
I

think this kind of statute avoids the problems Justice

Brennan feels are inherent in obscenity law.

Oregon's

statute is not vague and provides clear guidance as to
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precisely what conduct is prohibited.

While one may argue

with the values reflected in the
various definitions, they
at least avoid the use of
terms like "patently offensive"
and "prurient." In addition,
the law does

not seek to regu-

late the private viewing or reading
habits of consenting
adults.
It treats obscenity solely in
terms of an intrusion
and as Kuh states

Were legislative enactment to succeed
in
driving objectionable items from public
view, while permitting adults privat ely
to buy, to read, to see, or to hear far
more objectionable materials, the meaningful rights of all would be reconciled
The
majority would be spared the discomfort of
being forcibly confronted by the depersonalizing, the embarrassing, the crude; the
minority would, as part of the same legislative framework, be freed to enjoy more of
what it wished, quietly and without fan-

fare.^

Justice Brennan's approach in Slato n can be summarized
as follows.

He rejects the regulation of expression on the

basis of its allegedly obscene content.

That kind of expres-

sion cannot be defined with enough precision to avoid three

major problems:

(1)

the inevitable censoring of materials

that warrant First Amendment protection;

(2)

the failure to

provide fair notice as to exactly what kind of expression is
prohibited;

(3)

the creation of severe internal division

within the Supreme Court and between that body and lower
courts.

To overcome these problems Brennan would require a

system in which regulation of sexually oriented materials
focus on the conduct of those distributing such material.

Limitation of that conduct would be justified only when it
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led to unwarranted intrusion
into one's privacy.
Obviously,
such an approach is not without
problems.
But it is equally
clear that use of some form of
Justice Brennan's design
would overcome many of the serious
First Amendment problems
generated by the vagueness of Roth
and its prgeny.

The most consistent theme in all
of Justice Brennan's
obscenity opinions is his attempt to
insure that protected
expression is not censored along with
the obscene.
After 17
years of frustration with trying to
fashion "sensitive
tools" to separate obscene from
non-obscene expression he
simply surrendered the effort because,
he felt, the task
could not be accomplished. What he recommends
as an alternative approach is one which treats obscenity
primarily in
terms of the use to which it is put rather
than as a problem
of evaluating the content of expression.
In short, obscenity,

whatever it may be, is subject to limitation, not as a form
of expression but only when its use constitutes an
invasion
of privacy.

Justice Brennan's shift to this position brings

him very close to the absolutism of Black and Douglas at
least in so far as obscenity censorship is concerned.
such,

As

it is clearly one of the more significant evidences of

his concern that expression be as unfettered as possible.

CHAPTER

II

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND LIBEL

Libel law is designed to afford the
individual some
protection against defamatory communication.
An injured
party can attempt to recover damages for
harm inflicted and.
in states with criminal libel laws,
the government may
choose to prosecute the alleged libellor.
It is clear then
that libel, as a means of directly punishing
expression,
raises First Amendment questions.

But Justice Brennan and

the Court did not deal with the general area of
libel but

instead with somewhat narrower questions.

During the

period covered herein, twelve of the seventeen libel cases
decided by the Court involved alleged defamation of govern-

ment officials. 86

The five remaining cases concerned

people who, while not working for government, were, for some
reason,

in the public eye.
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As in the obscenity censorship cases, Justice Brennan

played a major role in giving voice to the Court's position
regarding libel.

Of the seventeen decisions handed down be-

tween 1957 and 1974, Brennan wrote the majority or lead

opinion in five cases and also clearly influenced the one
per curiam opinion in the group. 88

But, as we shall see,

these figures alone do not reflect the very substantial
34

contribution he has ™ade to libel
law and First Amendment
theory.

Justice Brennan's opinions in this
area of law deal
primarily with two overlapping
issues:
the extent of First
Amendment protection afforded critics
of government, and the
right of the press to publish, and
the people to know,
matters of public interest. As a result,
his libel

opinions constitute some of the more
important statements
of what Brennan views as the "central
meaning" of the First
Amendment. And perhaps his most important
statement

of all

is contained in the first case to be
considered here. New

York Times

v.

Sullivan

.

The action reviewed in New York Times was initiated

by

L.

B.

Sullivan, a county commissioner of Montgomery

County, Alabama.

Sullivan claimed he had been libelled by

an advertisement in the Times which discussed civil
rights

activities in Alabama.
ad were false. 91
in damages.

Several of the statements in the

The trial jury awarded Sullivan $500,000

That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court

of Alabama against the Times

'

contention that such awards

constituted an unconstitutional invasion of freedom of press.
In arriving at their decisions, Alabama courts had ap-

plied a rule of law which held that libel was unprotected by
the First Amendment,

that false communications were likewise

unprotected, that injury to official reputation

\<ras

a basis
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for a recovery and that
truth was a proper defense.
But for
a unanimous Supreme
Court, the entire rule was
defective.
In holding that libel was not
afforded constitutional
protection, the Alabama courts had
relied on several rulings
of the United States Supreme Court. ^2
But it was clear,
Brennan asserted for the Court, that
none of these decisions
upheld the use of libel as a means of
regulating criticism
of the conduct of government.
In deciding the question now, we are
compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give
more weight to the epithet "libel" than any
we
have to other "mere labels" of state law.
[Ljibel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations.
It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment

The First Amendment, for Brennan, had as its
central purpose
the assurance of free debate on public issues, debate
which

"...

may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-

pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
The advertisement in question, he said, was an expression of

protest on a significant social issue and as such

x^as

af-

forded constitutional protection unless that protection was
to be voided by the falsity of statements in the ad.

But Justice Brennan also rejected this second feature
of the Alabama rule.

The First Amendment had never been

viewed as protecting only "true" statements.

False state-

ments were inevitable in a free debate, Brennan said, and

must therefore be protected if expression was to have the

necessary "breathing space" to survive.

The fact that criticism of
an official was effective
and damaged his reputation
was also insufficient
justification for limiting expression.
Government officials, city
commissioners among them, are
to be treated as "
men
of fortitude, able to thrive
in a hardy climate.
."95
.

[

.

.

.

For Justice Brennan, the
history of the Sedition Act
of 1798 indicated that the
combination of these last two
elements, factual error and defamatory
content, also failed
as justifications for limiting
criticism of government. The
Sedition Act, which in Brennan' s words.
first crysta-

"...

lized a national awareness of the
central meaning of the
First Amendment .", 56 had been condemned
by Jefferson and
Madison, by Justices of the Supreme Court,
and by students
of the Constitution.
These views reflect a broad consensus that
the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the
First Amendment. 9/
The limitations that were now seen to render the
Sedition

Act unconstitutional were applicable to the states
through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and it does not matter at all
that
a state may permit restrictions on speech to be imposed

through civil suit rather than criminal prosecutions.
Brennan, the crucial point was that the restrictions
effected.

The means are irrelevant.

For
xv^ere

Requiring truth in

criticism, Brennan declared, would inhibit the critic.

would hesitate to attack government because of fear of a

He
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libel action and awareness of
the difficulties involved
in
proving the truth of all of his
statements.
Legislation or
co™>on law rules producing such a
system of self-censorship
are therefore contrary to the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
To forbid such unconstitutional
restrictions without
creating an absolute constitutional
bar against all libel
suits, by public officials, Justice
Brennan announced what
has become kno™ as the "New York
Times Rule", the rule

which summarized all his objections to the
Alabama rule at
issue here.
The constitutional guarantees require, we
think a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or V7ith reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. 98

Justice Brennan felt that the privilege created by this rule
was "analogous" to that created in Barr

v.

Matte o.^^

That

case had extended an absolute privilege to the statements of
a government official when they were made as part of his

official responsibilities.-^^^

But, of course,

the New York

Times privilege is conditional, not absolute, and thus the

protection afforded the citizen critic and that available to
the official are not identical. 101

Nevertheless, even under

the New York Times rule, Sullivan did not have grounds to

recover damages
Justice Brennan'

s

New York Times rule has the effect
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of creating a constitutional
standard for all libel cases
involving criticism of the
official conduct of
public
-C

officials.

And as Harry Kalven points out,
the Court in
this case was "compelled" to
reach this
result.

^^^^^

Alabama had tried to do was to
punish an unpopular view, the
pro-civil-rights policy of the New_Yor^Times.
by allowing
the award of monetary judgments which,
if upheld
as consti-

tutional, could, in this case, have
driven the paper into
bankruptcy, and could have been employed
against any newspaper voicing an opinion contrary to that
favored by the
citizens of a state who were likely to make
up juries in
civil or criminal cases.

Before examining Justice Brennan's Times interpretation of the First Amendment, several points should
be made.
First, one must keep in mind the "discrete context"
in which
the actual malice standard was formulated.

It is a rule to

be applied in libel cases brought by government officials

against citizen-critics of their official conduct.

It says

nothing about criticism of an official's private life.
Justice Brennan did not make that distinction explicit until
a few months after Times when,

in his Garrison "'"^^ opinion

he wrote

We recognize that different interests may be
involved where purely private libels, totally
unrelated to public affairs, are concerned;
therefore nothing we say today is to be taken
as intimating any views as to the impact of
the constitutional guarantees in the discrete
area of purely private libels. ^^4
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But the difficulty here is
where to draw the line.
Surely,
there are facets of an official's
private life which bear

significantly on the performance of
his official duties and
would therefore seem to be germane
to a discussion of
"public affairs." And, obviously,
providing such a publicprivate distinction priori is impossible.
Consequently,

the potential critic cannot be sure
ahead of time whether or
not his criticism is covered by the Times
privilege. Moreover, the Times privilege, even where it
applies, is not
absolute.
If the comments are made with "actual
malice"--

knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the
truth--they
may properly be the basis for the award of damages.
At

the same time, the comments of a government official,

speaking within his official responsibilities, are protected
by an absolute privilege.

Justice Brennan has commented

that the citizen-critic has as much a "duty to criticize" as
an official has to administer.

But the conditional privi-

lege he creates in Times does not equip the citizen with

equal tools with which to perform his function.

While the Times case concerned the use of civil libel
laws against critics of government. Justice Brennan made it

clear that the same principles would apply to criminal
libel

106

--in short, that the state could not punish one who

had libelled a government official unless the criticism was

motivated by actual malice.

Thomas Emerson has commented

the Sedition Act of 1798 applied only to
'false' utterances, made with 'intent' to
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the constitutionality
of that T^^.^?^°-^^cing
tftZr
legislation the Supreme Court
never
suggested It would have been valid
had
it
clearly applied only to
'deliberate or reckless falsehood
The fact seems to be that
in Garrison and
A^^^^^S''i'?
°f
As_hton
had failed
to distinguIilTbit^een the
use oT criminal libel laws as
seditious libel
supplement
to the
law of'cLiriibe?.JS7'"'"^'
'

What Justice Brennan's application of
the Times rule in
^^^^^^^^
t^^^
to severely narrow the grounds
upon
which the state can properly punish a
critic of

government.

But it does not entirely eliminate such
state power.
The fact that Justice Brennan does not call
for an
absolute privilege in either New York Times or
Garrison is
a result of his view of the First Amendment.

He feels that

the basic purpose, or "central meaning," as
he says, of the

First Amendment is to insure free public discussion
of sig-

nificant issues, particularly the operations of government.
This is the reason, he feels, that the Sedition Act of
1793
has been rejected by a "broad consensus."

The First Amend-

ment shelters debate even when it is unpleasant, unpopular,
or,

in some cases, when it is false.

"'^^

The Amendment must

reach this far, he feels, if government is to be made responsive to the people and if the people are to retain the
povzer to make the changes they desire through critical dis-

cussion of public issues.

And it is that kind of discussion that Justice Brennan
seeks to protect in Times and Garrison

.

The protection af-

forded the expression in those cases exists not because of
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the status of the
aa ^
cne -np-rQnr^o
persons discussed
but rather because of
the function performed by
that kind of discussion.
In
,

i

other words, Justice Brennan's
Times rule protects one of
the tools of self-government.
But actual malice does not
serve that end.

Calculated falsehood falls into that
class
of utterances which "are no
essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and
are of
such slight social value as a step
to
truth that any benefit that may be
trom them is clearly outweighed by derived
social
interest in order and morality. ..."
-Hence the knowingly false statement
j
and the false statement made with
reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. 109
*

One year after writing the above, Justice
Brennan enlarged
on this point in delivering the Alexander
Meiklejohn lecture
at Brown University."'""''^

Note that the New York Times principle has
an important qualification:
it does not
bar civil or criminal libel actions for
false criticism of the official conduct of
a public official if that criticism is made
with knox^^ledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or
true.
The underpinning of that qualif ica-,
tion is the 'redeeming social value' test.

Brennan 's Times- Garrison privilege

is

cause actual malice, like obscenity,

conditional then becontributes little

to the interchange of ideas and therefore does not warrant

First Amendment Protection.
One difficulty with this view has been pointed out by

Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rosenbloom

v.

In order for particular defamation to come
within the privilege there must be a

Metromedia ."'""'

determination that the event
mate public interest. That was of legitidetermination
generally
and ir?f.'°i^^
^^^^ analysis, by this Court
?
in particular.
[CJourts will be required to somehow pass on the
legitimacy of
interest
a particular event or
subject
wnat information is relevant to
selfgovernment. ... The danger such
a doctrine
.

.

.

m

r

P"--^

en L

.

In short,

the actual malice rule leaves
the door open for
limitation of criticism of government.
Of course, the only
way to avoid that possibility is to
adopt Justice Black's
view that all libel laws violate the
First

Amendment

But in libel, as in obscenity. Justice
Brennan stops just
short of the absolutist view.

Justice Brennan did not attempt to define
"public
official" in either Times or Garrison
But he did confront
.

that issue two years later in Rosenblatt v. Baer

.

-^-^^

Before the Supreme Court, Baer had argued that the

question as to whether he was a public official within New
York Times should be resolved by state standards.

Justice

Brennan rejected that view, stating that its recognition

would result in constitutional protection varying with state
lines.

At the same time he refused to give any precise

definition of "public official" because he insisted this
case did not require such a definition.

The purpose of the

New York Times rule was to insure wide open discussion of
public policy and of persons responsible for

it.

It is clear, therefore, that the "public
official" designation applies at the very
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a'^ong the

hierarchy of governlltl^ employees
ment
who have, or appea? to fhl
public to have, substantial
control over the
conduct of governmental affairs.
117
In a footnote, Justice
Brennan added to that definition:

The employee's position must
be
would mvite public scrutiny and one which
discussion
of the person holding it,
entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion
occasioned
by the particular charges in
controversy 118
.

If an individual fell under
this definition, he was a public

official within the meaning of the New
York Times rule and,
consequently, statements directed at him
must meet the
knowing falsity or reckless-disregard-f
or-truth standard
before damages could properly be awarded.
It would be useful here to examine
the components of

Justice Brennan'

s

definition of "public official".

Clearly,

it is one of the critical elements in the
New York Times

rule.

Initially,

it should be understood that Brennan sees

his definition as minimal, or, in his own words,
that it ap-

plies "at the very least" to the group he designates.

This

means, of course, that even those who fall outside the

Rosenblatt definition might be brought within the concept of
"public official".

For Brennan, a public official is, first

of all, and most obviously, one who is employed by government.

That employee must have "substantial responsibility"

for policy.

Even if the employee only appears to have re-

sponsibility for policy, he is still within the Brennan
definition. 119

All of this would seem to indicate an ex-

tremely broad definition which could conceivably include

almost all government employees.

But,

in the footnote to

his opinion quoted above.
Justice Brennan adds a
significant
limitation.
The employee's position,
he said, must be one
which is the subject of public
discussion in

normal times-

apart from a particular controversy.

m

short,

it would seem

that the Times rule does not
become operative when controversy surrounds a government employee
who would not be the
subject of discussion except in the
context of a specific
controversy.
Justice Brennan justifies this limit
on his
public official definition by stating
that it is required if
the social interest in protecting
reputation is not to be
ignored.

One potential problem with Brennan'

s

limitation here

is that it is precisely during controversy
that the greatest

latitude for discussion is required.

VThile it is unlikely,

it is possible that an unnoticed government
employee, one

who was not the subject of public discussion in normal
times, could become involved in a controversy having
conse-

quences for public policy.

But under the limitation Brennan

places on his own definition, expression in such a case is
not afforded the full protection of the New York Times rule.

Probably in such a situation Brennan would resort to

weighing the social significance of the controversy against
the interest in protecting the employee's reputation.

Given Brennan'

s

view of the role of free expression in a

democratic system, the balance almost surely would be struck
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in favor of an "unfettered
interchange of ideas."

Justice Brennan's opinion also
attempts to clarify
the relationship between the
privilege in Barr and the privilege created by NewYork^i^^.
justice Brennan seemed t o
make this connection himself in
his Times opinion.
Speaking
of the Times rule he said,
Such a privilege for criticism of
official
conduct is appropriately analogous to
the
protection accorded a public official xvhen
he IS sued for libel by a private
citizen
In Barr v. Matteo,
this Court held
the utterance of a federal official to
be
absolutely privileged if made 'within the
outer perimeter' of his duties.
The
reason for the official privilege is said to
be that the threat of damage suits would
otherwise inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of policies
of government' and dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible in the unflinching discharge of
their duties.
Barr v. Matteo
Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government.
It is as much his duty to criticize as it
is the official's duty to administer i20
.

.

.

.

.

Brennan draws the same analogy in his Garrison opinion
But in Rosenblatt

,

Justice Brennan states that official pri-

vilege and citizen privilege are not tied to one another
The New York Times rule, he said, seeks to protect discussion

and not "retaliation."

The reference to Barr

"...

should

be taken to mean no more than that the scope of the privilege is to be determined by reference to the function it
"^^^
serves.

What Brennan means here is simply that the Barr and
New York Times privileges exist for the purpose of insuring
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effective government and
effective public participation
therein, and not to provide
adversaries with similar weapons.
For
him, the governed and those
who govern each have functions
to perform, both of which can
be aided by allowing them
realtively free discussion.

Justice Brennan's basic goal in Ne w
York Times and
Garrison was to protect the free flow
of information.
In
order to achieve that goal his New York
Time s rule was
fashioned to protect innocent error. But
the New York Times
rule applies only to libel of public
officials by critics of
their official conduct.
But of course freedom of expression
and the free flow of information can be
limited by means
other than libel suits filed by public officials
or criminal
prosecutions of the critics of public officials.
Justice

Brennan confronted such a situation in Time Inc

.

v.

Hill.-*-^^

In 1952, James Hill and his family were held
hostage
in their home by three escaped convicts.

hours, they were released unharmed.

After nineteen

In his comments follow-

ing release. Hill emphasized that the convicts had treated
all of his family well and that there had been no violence.

Moving to Connecticut shortly after the apprehension of the
convicts. Hill discouraged further publicity.

The year

following the incident, a novel was published. The Desperate
Hours, which depicted an experience similar to that of the

Hills except that the convicts in the book were violent to-

ward their captives.

The book was then made into a play.
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A Life magazine story about
the play became the subject
of
this case.

Life had run a story in February,
1955, which d 1.Scussed the opening of the play
and carried pictures of s ome
of the scenes photographed at
the house in which the Hill s
had been held captive.
The text accompanying the pictures
stated that the play had been "inspired"
by the Hill incident.
Mr. Hill then brought suit in
New York courts, under
a state law protecting privacy,
charging that Life had
falsely connected the play with his experience.
He eventually won $30,000 in damages.

New York Courts had treated Hill as a "newsworthy"
person.

Under the prevailing interpretation of the state's

privacy law, such persons were entitled to recover
damages
reports of their activities were "fictitious".
Justice

i

Brennan felt that the law could not escape constitutional
infirmity unless it required proof of knowing or reckless
falsity before damages could be awarded.

The protection af-

forded free expression is not reserved for political affairs
only.

The exposure the Hills experienced was, from Brennan'

point of view, a consequence of living in a society vzhich

places great value on free public discussion.

The Life

article at issue was "a matter of public interest."

For

Brennan, discussion of that sort inevitably contained some
error.
is

And innocent error must be protected if expression

to perform its vital functions.
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What Justice Brennan did in
the Hill case was to impose the "actual malice" rule
on privacy suits filed by
newsworthy persons. As he pointed
out, this was not a
"blind application" of the Times
rule for that rule applies
only in libel suits filed by
public officials.
But the
basic problem, the interruption in
the free flow of information, was the same in Hill as in
Times.
In the former, the

device employed to impose that limitation
was a privacy
action, in the latter, a libel suit.
But, for Justice
Brennan, what is important is not the
nature of the device
used to impose the restriction but simply
the fact that

speech has been limited.

Free expression required the same

degree of protection in both cases since it was
performing
the same function--f acilitating discussion of
issues of pub-

lic interest.

The question of whether the Times rule was to apply
to libel suits filed by someone other than a public
official

was not raised until three years after the initial formulation of the standard.

The Court dealt with that issue in

Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts and Associated Press v.
T
125
Walker
.

Wallace Butts was employed by a private corpora-

tion as athletic director at the University of Georgia.

brought suit against the Saturday Evening Post

,

He

published by

Curtis Publishing Company, based on a Post article which

alleged that he had fixed

a

football game between Georgia

and Alabama by giving the Alabama coach, Paul Bryant, certain plays Georgia had planned to use.

The trial in

U.

S.
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District Court was completed
before the New_Yorl^Times
decision was announced.
Curtis offered no

c^^I^^^^^^J^^^

fenses,

depending entirely on the defense
of truth.
In part
of his charge to the jury,
the judge made the award of
punitive damages dependent on a finding
of actual malice, which
he defined as "
the notion of ill will, spite,
hatred
and an intent to injure one. Malice
also denotes a wanton
or reckless indifference of culpable
negligence with regard
to the rights of others. "'126 ^^^^ .^^^
^^^^^
'

.

.

.

^^^^^^

awarding $60,000 compensatory damages and
$400,000 punitive
damages.
Curtis' motion for a new trial was denied
and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Walker case involved an Associated Press news

dispatch concerning the activities of retired General
Edwin
Walker at the University of Mississippi during disturbances
over integration of the University.

The A. P. report stated

that Walker had "assumed command" of a mob and had led a

charge against federal marshals.

Walker filed a libel suit

in Texas courts seeking a total of $2,000,000 in compensa-

tory and punitive damages.

A. P.

and on constitutional defenses.

based its defense on truth
The jury was instructed that

it could award compensatory damages if the dispatch was not

substantially true and that punitive damages could be added
if the article was motivated by ill will, bad or evil

motive or entire want of care.

The jury awarded $500,000

compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages.

But the

trial judge refused to enter
the punitive award because,
in
his view, no actual malice
was indicated.
Both sides appealed to the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals which affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Texas denied
a writ of error.

Justice Harlan's lead opinion
presents an interesting
alternative approach to that of Justice
Brennan and will
therefore be examined in some detail.

Harlan felt that freedom of expression
is important
both for society and for the individual.
Socially, freedom
of expression helps maintain our
political system while
at

the same time permitting each man to state
his opinion.

But

even though free expression is important, it
is not unlimited.
Limitations can be imposed when the rights and
liberties of others are infringed.

Yet not all forms of

limitation are acceptable.
Our touchstones are that acceptable limitations must neither affect 'the impartial distribution of news' and ideas.
nor because of their historical impact constitute
a special burden on the press,
nor
deprive our free society of the stimulating
benefit of varied ideas because their purveyors fear physical or economic retribution
solely because of what they choose to think
and publish. 127
.

.

.

,

.

.

,

The history of libel law made it clear, for Harlan, that
there was a basic conflict between it and the American tra-

dition of free expression.

Libel had been changed because

of that conflict but the basic antithesis remained, since

libel still

"...

limits the freedom of the publisher to

express certain sentiments at least without guaranteeing

52

legal proof of their
substantial accuracy "128 ^^^^.^^
-y
alone was not enough to remove
a publisher's protection,
Harlan stated.
The Court had so indicated
in New York iin.es
and in Hill.
But protection did cease
when thTT^^^^TT^
cated that a publisher had
conducted himself improperly and
thereby created a false publication.
The Times decision,
Harlan said, made it clear that
libel judgments based on
misconduct were constitutionally
permissible.
The benefit
of this approach, for Harlan, is
that it permits limitation
on expression which could be "neutral
with respect to the
content of the speech."
.

But while he saw the Times decision as
providing some
guidance in Curtis and Associated Press he
felt that the
critical elements of Times were absent. While
the Times
case involved analogies to seditious libel,
none were pre,

sent in the instant cases, and neither Curtis nor
the A.

P.

were entitled to special protection for their utterances.
Since the context of these cases was different than that of
Times,

the Court,

said Harlan, was required to rely on a

standard other than the Times rule.

That standard was pro-

vided by the prevailing rules of liability

with respect to compensation of persons
injured by the improper performance of a
legitimate activity by another. Under these
rules, a departure from the kind of care society may expect from a reasonable man performing such activity leaves the actor open
to a judicial shifting of loss.
In defining
these rules
courts have consistently
given much attention to the importance of
defendants' activities ^29
.

.

.

.

As well as focusing on a
defendant's activities, courts
also
have examined the plaintiffs
position in order to determine
whether he was properly calling
on the court for protection
given his "prior activities and
means of self defense."
For Harlan, the material in
question in Curtis and
^^l^£i^ted_Press was of legitimate interest
to the public.
Further, both Butts and Walker were
public figures

within

ordinary libel law and both also had
access to means of
self-defense against published charges.
Given this type of
case, involving public figures, the
states, Harlan
felt,

could not be left free to devise whatever
type of libel law
they felt necessary. IThat was required was
some "constitutional safeguard."
We consider and would hold that a
"public figure" who is not a public official may also recover damages for defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent,
on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers 130
.

Using this standard, Harlan found that the conduct of Curtis
Publishing was an "extreme departure" from the investigatory
standards followed by responsible publishers
on the other hand, had not acted improperly.

.

The A. P.,

Consequently,

the judgment for Butts was upheld x^hile the award to Walker

was reversed and remanded.

Harry Kalven has commented that the Curtis - A. P.

opinion represents Harlan in

"

.

.

.

his familiar role as the
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Justice who, in the aftermath of
a fresh burst of energy
by
the court, comes forward to tidy
things up."132

opinion in these cases is quite a
bit more than just a clarification of New York Times. What
Harlan did in Curtis-A.P
was to expand on his own concurringdissenting opinion in
133
Time V. Hill,
thereby making a significant departure
from
the Times rule.
.

He would have the Court employ a sliding
scale of

press privilege based upon the evaluation of
several elements:
the proximity to seditious libel, the status

of the

alleged libellant, and his related ability to respond
to
falsity. 134

Harlan would provide the most extensive privi-

lege in cases involving public officials.

rule would apply.
to seditious libel,

There, the Times

But as one moves away from cases analogous
the privilege shrinks.

would apply three different standards:

In effect, Harlan

the Times rule where

public officials are involved, a standard of gross negligence
in cases involving public figures, and a fair comment rule

when private persons involuntarily become newsworthy.

The

purpose of Harlan's calculus is to insure a competition of
ideas.

Consequently, the degree of protection afforded ex-

pression is pegged to the ability of the two "combatants" to
respond to each others' arguments.

/justice Brennan's brief opinion explained his concurrence in the disposition of

A. P

and his dissent in Curtis

He agreed with Chief Justice Warren's view that the Times

rule should apply to both public officials and public

figures.

Since the lower court
decision in
was clearly
inconsistent with Ti^,
reversal was required.
But he would
have had the Court remand
Curtis despite his view
that the
evidence would support a
judgment for Butts under the
"actual malice" standard.
Brennan's concern in Butts was
with the judge's charge to the
jury, which he felt was not
consistent with NewJ^ork^i^.
The charge failed, he said,
for two reasons.
First, while allowing damages
if actual
malice was present, the trial
judge defined actual malice,
in. part, as encompassing ill
will or hatred. This meant
that the motive of expression was
made relevant, and he and
the majority had rejected that view
in Garrison
Second,
.

Brennan indicated that the trial judge
allowed the Post to
show, in mitigation of damages, that
it had relied

in good

faith on its sources.

This resulted in the jury being author-

ized to award some damages even though the Post
had acted in
good faith. That, he said, was inconsistent
with the Times
ruling.
Because of these defects in the instructions,

Brennan would have required a jury to make the decision
in
^^^tis with a proper charge even though he felt that the

ultimate resolution of the case could be the same.
The basic difference between Justices Brennan
and Harlan is that Brennan views freedom of expression as
the most important interest to be preserved while Harlan

views it as simply one of many important interests to be
protected.

Four years after the Curtis decision. Justice
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Harlan stated
Just as an automobile negligently
driven
can cost a person his
physical and mental
well being and the fruits of
his labo?
so can a printing press
negligently set.^^^
In short,

the publisher is dealt with
as is any other tort-

feasor.

But Justice Brennan views the
press as having a
uniquely critical role to play in
the free interchange of
ideas.
Consequently, he would have the Times
rule protect
the press be it public official or
public figure who is discussed.
And that is due to his focus on the
function of expression in each case rather than the
status of the people
involved.
It should be noted here that the voting
alignment in

Butts and A. P. produced a rather curious result.
no majority opinion in Butts

.

There was

Justice Harlan's opinion,

joined by Clark, Stewart and Fortas, rejected application
of
the Times rule to public figures.
Instead he would
require

such persons to prove gross negligence on the part of
the

publisher before damages could be awarded.

Chief Justice

Warren concurred but only to carry the decision for Butts.
He felt that the Times rule should apply to public figures.

Justice Brennan, joined by White, felt that the judge's charge
to the jury did not comport with Time s and therefore dis-

sented.

Justices Black and Douglas dissented calling for

the rejection of Times in toto to be replaced by an absolute

privilege.

In A. P.

,

the Court voted unanimously to reverse

the awarding of damages.

The Chief Justice, speaking for
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Brennan and White, held that
the Times rule had not
been met
Black and Douglas concurred,
making Warren's opinion th.
le
majority view. Justices Harlan,
Clark, Stewart and Fort,:as
also concurred, but on the
grounds that the A.P. had
not
been guilty of gross negligence.
To sunnnarize, Justices
Harlan, Clark, Stewart, White,
Fortas, Brennan and the Chief
Justice felt that Butts and Walker
were public figures.
Brennan, White, Warren, Black, and
Douglas voted in A^^ to
make the Times rule applicable to
individuals so defined.
But, in Butts, Justi.^es Harlan,
Clark, Stewart and Fortas
viewed New York Times as limited in
reach to public officials only and sustained the awarding
of damages to Butts on
the grounds of Curtis' "extreme departure
from the standards
of investigation and reporting normally
adhered to." The
net result of these differences was that the
Court had

ruled that the Times rule applied to public figures
when, as
in

A^,

libel judgments were reversed, but did not apply
to

public figures when, as in Butts

,

libel judgments were sus-

tained.

The important element of these cases for this study
is,

of course. Justice Brennan'

s

vote to extend the "actual

malice" rule of New York Times to libel cases filed by public figures.

But,

as has been pointed out,

the status of

those filing libel suits was not, for Brennan, what defined
the scope of the privilege.

Rather he sought to protect

discussion of public issues. 136

In this regard his views in
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Butts and
Douglas.

bring him closer to those
of Justi,-ce

'-^^

Curtis and Butts were the last
major libel decisi.-ons
handed down during Earl Warren's
^^8
tenure on
the Court.

The resignation of the Chief Justice
in 1969 marked the beginning of a period of frequent changes
in the membership of
the Court.
By 1971, when the Court made its
decision in
Rosenbloom,139
^^^^ ^^.^^ ^.^^^ decision
to date,

new Justices had taken their seats:

two

Warren Burger had been

appointed Chief Justice and Harry Blackmun
had assumed the
seat vacated by Justice Fortas.
As we shall
see,

the two new

members of the Court were to play a critical
role in a significant extension of the "actual malice" rule.
Before turning to a discussion of Rosenbloom

.

brief

mention should be made of several of the court's libel
rulings immediately preceding that case.

While none of them

can be considered as significant as Rosenbloom

,

they did help

to make the Times rule somewhat more specific.

Perhaps the most unique case in this group was a case
the Court refused to hear, Ginzburg v. Goldwater

.

Justices allowed to stand a Circuit Court of Appeals

The
ruling"'"'^^-'-

that Senator Barry Goldwater had been libelled by an article
in Fact magazine, whose publisher was Ginzburg, published

during the 1964 presidential campaign.

In that article,

it

was stated that Goldwater was a "paranoid personality" and

therefore unfit for the Presidency.

The Court of Appeals
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held that since Ginzburg
neither sought nor himself
possessed
the expertise to reach such
a conclusion,
publication of
such a charge constituted
"actual malice" as defined in
the
Times case.
Justice Black, joined by Douglas,
added a
written dissent to the Court's
memorandum decision. Black
pointed out that while the Circuit
Court's ruling exemplified the inadequacy of the Times
standard, two additional
factors made the lower court's decision
"all the more oppressive and ominous." At the time the
article was published, Goldwater was the Republican
presidential nominee.
For Black, untrue statements during a
campaign were "in-

evitable and perhaps essential."

Further, the damages

awarded were totally punitive}^^ indicating
that the jury
did not find the article damaging.
In fact, Goldwater

him-

self did not claim he had been damaged.

For Black, the

proper course was to hear the case, reject New York Times
and extend an absolute privilege to discuss public
affairs.

Justice Brennan joined Justice Stewart's majority

opinion in the four other cases immediately preceding

Rosenbloom
terms,

.

Handed down during the 1969-1970 and 1970-1971

these decisions held that:

(1)

a public figure could

not recover damages under a rule of liability which did not

require a showing of actual malice

;

''"'^'^

(2)

publications

concerning candidates for public office are shielded by the
privilege created in New York Times

,

and the privilege

extends to "a-ything which
might touch on

o"-ce
;

(3)
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.

.

.

fUness for

a finding of actual
malice requires a showing

that the publisher had
serious doubts about the
truth of his
publication.
(4) the failure of a lower
court to consider
the Times rule in a libel
suit brought by a public
official
required reversal of that court's
decision.
Brennan's
silence ended with Ros_enbloom v.
Metromedia,
^^^^.^

now turn.
George Rosenbloom was a distributor
of nudist magazines in Philadelphia.
During a city campaign against obscenity, Rosenbloom was arrested for
possession of obscene
literature, and a quantity of the material
was
seized.

His

libel suit was based, in part, on a radio
report of that
arrest.
In describing the event, the reporter
failed to

describe the seized books as "allegedly" obscene,
an omission that was corrected in later broadcasts.
Rosenbloom and
some of his distributor colleagues then sought an
injunction

against local officials.

Again,

the radio station,

in re-

porting that story, referred to the plaintiffs as "smut
peddlers"

v7ho V7ere

trying to force local officials to "lay

off the smut literature racket."

In a separate action, a

state court subsequently held the seized books not obscene.

Apparently feeling that this finding gave him adequate
grounds on which to institute a suit, Rosenbloom sued the
radio station claiming that he had been defamed by the two

radio broadcasts in question.

The District Court's
handling of the case raised
the
xssue Which was to be of
central concern to the
Supreme
court.
The lower court reasoned
that since Rosenbloom was
neither a public official nor
a public figure, the
Ti^es requirement of actual malice did
not apply.
instead the jury
was instructed in accordance
with Pennsylvania libel law
which permitted recovery of
damages if it could be shown
that falsehoods had been
published without reasonable
care

being taken to ascertain their
truth.

Rosenbloom was awarded

geueral and punitive damages but, on
appeal, the Circuit
Court reversed, holding that the
Times rule was in fact applicable, and that the evidence could
not sustain a finding
for Rosenbloom under that standard.

Justice Brennan delivered the lead opinion
joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
For him
the

issue was clear--whether the "actual malice"
standard applied to private persons as well as to public figures
and

public officials.

While New York Times and its progeny had

referred to the status of the individuals discussed,
Brennan indicated that those decisions most importantly
dealt with issues of "public or general interest."

In short,

he maintained that while the Court had focused on the status
of individuals,

the determining factor was actually the

nature of the issue involved.

Free discussion of all public

issues was necessary, he said, since

Self governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and debate

about the strictly official
activities of
°' government.
The'co'L?'Te'utTf Ir^'
country to the institution of
^TUr.ri
private property, protected by
Process and Just Compensation the Due
Clauses in
P^^^^^
P^^^^te
hands
vast ar'^^^''f^°'''
areas of economic and social
power
that vitally affect the nature
and quality
ot life
the nation.
Our efforts to live
and work together in a free society
not
completely dominated by governmental
lation necessarily encompass far more reguthan
politics
a narrow sense. ^'^•^

m

m

Since the First Amendment extended
to "myriad" matters of
public interest, it was artificial to
base the degree of
constitutional protection of expression on
the status of the
persons discu-sed. Even in cases in which
a private individual was involuntarily thrust into discussion
of an issue
of public interest, his interest in his
privacy was over-

ridden by the necessity that the public have full
information.

So that the law would recognize that necessity,

Brennan announced an extension of the Times rule.
We thus hold that a libel action, as here,
by a private individual against a licensed
radio station for a defamatory falsehood
in a newscast relating to his involvement
in an event of public or general concern may
be sustained only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not -^^^
.

No other standard, neither "reasonable care" nor negligence,

would provide the required "breathing space" for the First
Amendment.

Within this reformulation of the Times rules,

Rosenbloom had no basis for recovery of damages.

A word must be said here about Justice Brennan 's two

supporters in Rosenbloom, chief
Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun.
Burger and Blaclonun joined
what was. aside from
the absolutist position, the
most liberal view on the
Court.
But I think it would be an error
to assume that this indicates their general agreement
with Brennan's view of freedom
of expression. What seems to
me a more accurate reflection
of their First Amendment views
is found in the Millerl^l

Slaton 152 cases as well as in several
other obscenity deci153
sions.
It IS clear from those opinions,
written by the
Chief Justice and joined by Blackmun,
that they both object
to what they call "commercial
exploitation" of erotica.
The
broadcasts to which Rosenbloom objected
concerned his
al-

leged distribution of such material.

In short, it seems to

me that Burger and Blackmun joined Brennan's
rejection of

Rosenbloom'

s

claims because they disapproved of the latter'

"sordid business" rather than because they agreed
with

Brennan's broad reading of the First Amendment.

This of

course means that when a more savory individual presents

similar issues to the Court, Brennan may not be able to attract their support.

Justice Brennan's libel opinions are clearly among
the most significant statements he has made as to the

meaning of the First Amendment.

In them he makes clear his

view that the Amendment's basic purpose is to protect the
free flow of information about issues of interest to the
public.

And his view of just what constitutes a public

issue is extremely broad
y Droaa.
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Ac he
i.^ said
^
As

m
•

another context:

S^^^^ speech and press was
interchlnge
of id^affo?
bringing about of politioil t^T
"^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ by the
peop?e
people.
°^Ati^
.All Ideas having the
slightest
importanct-unorthodox
idear':^^
r^'^'
^^^^^tro^7eTs±al
ideas, even ideas
haueful to the prevailing
climate
opinion--have the full protection of
of the
guarantees, unless excludable
because
they
encroach on the limited area of
more
impor^
tant interests f 54
?^^T.^''°^5''^^°''
'

.

.

In libel cases,
is calculated

the only expression lacking
social importance

falsehood-speech resulting from actual
malice.

As he did in regard to obscenity,
Justice Brennan condemns cal-

culated falsehood to the lower level of
Kalven's "two-levelfree-speech-theory"155__^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^
sideration need be given to the context in
which it is used.
.

^

That limitation on absolute freedom to
discuss public
issues is a very small one indeed.

What Justice Brennan has

accomplished with the "actual malice" rule is to make
it impossible to "accidentally" libel anyone when discussing

pub-

lic issues.

He has provided protection for innocent error

so that a publisher is aware that unless
he knowingly lies

or fails to make any effort at all to verify his
statements,
his discussion is shielded by the First Amendment.

At the

same time, Brennan has left the door open just enough to per-

mit punishment of expression solely designed to inflict injury.

In this sense then, Justice Brennan has struck what

seems to me to be the proper balance between freedom of ex-

pression and the right of the individual to protection from
defamation.

CHAPTER

III

JUSTICE BRENNAN AND INTERNAL
SECURITY
This final chapter examines Justice
Brennan's vi<-ews
in several different kinds of
freedom of expression cas<;es

which may be generally categorized as
internal security
cases.

The organization of this discussion
is similar to
that employed by Thomas I. Emerson in
his book. The System
of Freedom of Expression.
The first section examines

Justice Brennan's approach to the threats to
expression
posed by legislative investigations. This is
followed by
analysis of his viex7 of the relationship between
demonstrations and freedom of expression.

Both federal and state

governments have taken various steps to control allegedly
subversive organizations.

Two of the means employed, denial

of benefits to members and attempts to limit the suspected

organization's activities, comprise the next two sections of
this study.

The concluding section deals with Brennan's

views in several First Amendment cases which do not fit into
any neat classif icatory scheme.

But his opinions in several

of those cases constitute significant discussion of such

issues as prior restraint of the press,

access to the media.

"'"^^

and the right of
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As pointed out earlier in this study. Justice Brennan
65

66
has consistently rejected an
absolute interpretation of the
First Amendment.
Instead he has attempted to
strike a

balance between competing interests.

It is in the internal

security area that balancers are
perhaps most seriously
tested as to their commitment to that
approach.

This is so

because the interest most often placed
in opposition to fr ee
expression is the state's interest in
self-preservation. As
we will see, several of those Justices
who claim

to favor the

balancing approach totally abandon it as soon
as the state
claims that self-preservation is the
interest
they seek to

protect through limiting a particular form of
expression.
But Justice Brennan is not among that group.
His willingness, in fact his insistence, on balancing as
the proper ap-

proach is evident in many of the cases to be discussed
below.

This is particularly true of those involving legisla-

tive investigations, to which we now turn.

Most investigations by legislative committees have
not raised First Amendment issues.
1930

's

But beginning in the

both federal and state legislatures made increasing

use of committee investigations to inquire into what were

alleged to be subversive activities.

Such investigations

necessitated the calling of witnesses who were questioned
as to their political opinions and associations.

Inevit-

ably, such persons, whether or not they cooperated with the

committee, were stamped as disloyal and suffered the

predictable consequences.

But it was not the witnesses alone
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whose First Amendment rights
sucb were infr^-r..
intrmgeda upon. Those who
were fortunate to avoid
direct
-i-A-ecL confron^p^^r^
conrrontation with a committee
like the House Committee on
Internal Security^59

^^^^^
help but feel that it was
dangerous to express an
unorthodox
political view.
In short, the existence
of such connnittees
most surely has had a chilling
effect on expression.
Justice Brennan's initial contact
with the First
Amendment issues raised by investigations
of subversion came
in the Watkins^^Q and Sweeze^^^l
^^^^^
^^^^
cases he joined in Chief Justice
Warren's opinion for the
Court.

In Watkins the Court held that a
witness before the

House Un-American Activities Committee
(HUAC) could not be
compelled to testify about the alleged Communist
Party membership of others because he had not been
informed of the

pertinence of the question to the Committees task.

Warren

also stated that the First Amendment imposed
limitations on
the power of Congress to investigate.

The Court, the Chief

Justice held, must balance Congressional need for the
infor-

mation sought against "the individual interest in privacy."
But Warren avoided striking any balance here basing the de-

cision instead on the pertinence issue noted above.

Sweezey

,

In

involving an investigation conducted by a state

attorney general, the Chief Justice again relied on due
process grounds to reverse the contempt conviction of a witness who refused to answer questions relating to a lecture
he gave at the University of New Hampshire.

Speaking for

himself and Justices Brennan, Black and Douglas, Warren
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ruled that the authorization
for the investigation
had
failed to set proper limits
on the inquiry.

In both these cases
First Amendment issues were
recog-

nized by the Court but did
not serve as the articulated
bases of the decisions.
But

at the same time it is clear

that the presence of such
considerations lead the Court to
demand that investigating
committees proceed with greater
care than might be required if
First Amendment rights were
not involved.

Justice Brennan's first written opinion
in this area
was his dissent in Uphaus v. W^.162
Millard Uphaus was
executive director of World Fellowship, Inc.
which operated
a suimner camp in New Hampshire.
The Attorney
General of

that state acting, as in Sweeze
y, as a one man investigating

committee, subpoenaed lists of the camp employees
and its
guests.
Uphaus refused to produce the lists and was eventually jailed for contempt until he was willing
to comply.

His conviction was affirmed by the State Supreme
Court.
U.

S.

The

Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the

case to the state high court for reconsideration in light
of
Sweezey.

The state court reaffirmed its original decision

and the case again came before the Supreme Court.

Justice Clark delivered the majority opinion.

•'"^^

The

central issue, he felt, was whether the associational privacy
of the persons on the subpoenaed lists was outweighed by the

state's interest in self-preservation.

That state interest
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was -the ultimate value
of any society' and
thus it must prevail.
Consequently, the investigation
in support of that
interest was proper and
punishment of Uphaus for refusing
to
cooperate with it did not
constitute a denial of due process.
Justice Brennan's dissent attacked
the majority
for

failing to balance the interests
in conflict.
Unless the
Court was willing to make a
"universal" subordination of
speech and association to the state's
interest, drawing
the line between the competing
values would be difficult.
The problem is one in its nature
calling
tor traditional case-by-case
development
ot principles in the various
permutations
ot circumstances where the conflict
may
J
appear, loqFor Justice Brennan, the development of
the required principles was clearly the responsibility of the
judiciary.
The majority had failed to fulfill that
responsibility because it had treated the assertion of a state
interest by
the legislature as legitimizing the specific means
chosen
to support that interest.

Brennan's ovm examination of the

circumstances of the case led him to conclude that the only

purpose served by the Attorney General's activities was exposure of suspected subversives.

In short, he felt that

there was no valid state interest present here against which
to balance freedom of speech and association.

Consequently,

he would have reversed the state court.
As one writer has pointed out,

balancing is a
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"much abused doctrine."

The mistreatment has come
pri-

marily from Justices who
profess that it is the proper
method of resolving First Amendment

issues and at the same

time really fail to use it.
u

V.

u.

D.

Justice Harlan's opinion in

exempiities this curxous approach.

On the one hand he states,
^^here First Amendment rights are
asserted
to bar governmental interrogation

resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of the competing
private and public interests at stake in
the particular circumstances shown. ^67
But,

at the same time when Congress is
investigating Commu-

nism in support of the right of self-preservation,
that automatically quashes any First Amendment rights that
have been
asserted.

For Harlan the balance has already been struck
by

the legislature and the judiciary cannot substitute
its own
'^^
judgment.

What Justice Harlan fails to do is critical to a

meaningful balancing process.

He really does not examine

the facts in the case to determine whether the recalcitrant

witness in Barenblatt presented an actual threat to the preservation of the government.

Surely no one can reasonably

contend that if Barenblatt was in truth a threat to national

security the First Amendment would require the government to
stand back and do nothing,

"'"^^

point of asking that question.

but Harlan never reaches the

Any judicial protection of

the First Amendment evaporates as soon as Congress asserts
its interest.
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Justice Brennan's use of
the balancing approach
is
quite different for several
reasons.
First of all, unlike
Harlan, Brennan does not
believe in judicial self
restraint.
He is quite willing to employ
the Court's power to
block
legislative activities he feels
are improper.
Secondly,

he comes to a weighing of
the facts in each case
with a predisposition in favor of First
Amendment rights.
Consequently he demands very clear and
convincing evidence that
the investigation serves a
legitimate legislative purpose,
and that that goal cannot be
achieved in a manner that does
not infringe on First Amendment rights.
The clearest indication of that fact is Justice Brennan'
s voting pattern
and opinions in the ten cases examined
for this section.
In none of them did he vote to uphold
the specific assertion
of legislative power.
In dissent his most frequent com-

plaint was that the purpose of the particular
investigation
was "exposure purely for the sake of
exposure." And for

Justice Brennan that is not a purpose significant
enough
to limit First Amendment rights.
None of this means that Justice Brennan would absolutely forbid any legislative investigation which infringes
on freedom of expression.

Yet none of his own opinions give

clear indication of the conditions under which he would per-

mit such an investigation.

However Justice Brennan did join

Justice Goldberg's opinion in Gibson

Investigation Committee

"''^^
.

v.

Florida Legislative

In that opinion Goldberg held
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that individual and group

interest unless it was

rights would outweigh the
state

sho™

that the latter was compelling,

substantial, inMediate and
subordinating.

Both the language
and tone of Goldberg's opi.ic.n
suggest the clear and present
danger test-that unless an
individual or group presents a
clear and present danger to the
survival of the state their
First Amendment rights cannot be
limited by legislative
inquiries

think it is safe to say that Justice
Brennan would
impose similar rigorous requirements
on the investigatory
power.
And his opinions indicate that it matters
little
whether it is Congress or a state legislature
which has
limited free expression.
Because of his belief in the great
value of those rights he stands ready to employ
judicial
I

power regardless of the authority threatening
them.

Demonstrations
Justice Brennan'

s

opinions

in this area concern

what Harry Kalven has called "public issue picketing"

.

''''^

Picketing is of course conduct as well as expression.
Justice Brennan accepts the general proposition that
'picketing and parading are subject to regulation even

though intertwined with expression and

association.'"'"'^"^

Within that general framework the problem becomes specifying
under what conditions limitations may be properly imposed.
As will be seen, Justice Brennan'

s

belief in the "transcen-

dant value" of First Amendment rights results in his

recognizing few conditions
under which a state"4
perly curb demonstrations.

^J'

The major weapon Justice
Brennan employed to strike
dcvn state regulations was
the doctrine of overbreadth.
A statute is overbroad when
its prohibitions can
encompass
both protected and unprotected
expression.
^^^^.^
-ce

Brennan pointed out in his concurring
opinion in Brown
Louisiana,
overbreadth may be a

V,

result of the language

used in the law.

In that litigation, blacks
had staged a

sit-in at a public library.

They were convicted for vio-

lating a state law making it a crime
to congregate in a public building under circumstances likely
to produce a "breach
of the peace." Justice Brennan felt
that there was danger
that the broad sweep of "breach of peace"
might include con-

stitutionally protected activities

'"^^
.

It is clear that Brennan also feels that
one con-

fronted with an overbroad statute should be free
"to take
his chances and express himself."
^^.Iker V.

Birmingham

.

This was his view in

Reverend Wyatt Walker and several

other black clergymen had applied for a permit to conduct a
civil rights demonstration.

The city of Birmingham denied

the application 180 and obtained an injunction against any

civil rights demonstrations by Walker and his colleagues.

They did not reapply for a permit but instead conducted the

demonstration whereupon they were arrested and convicted of
contempt.

Justice Stewart writing for the majority and up-

holding the convictions recognized that there were substantial
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constitutional questions relating
to the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute upon
which the injunction was based.
But the state court which had
issued the injunction had
jurisdiction so the injunction
itself was valid.
Since the
demonstration was enjoined to support
a valid government mterest in regulation of the use of
streets, Stewart concluded that the proper way for the
plaintiffs to proceed was
to challenge the injunction
in Alabama courts rather

than to

violate it.
In a strongly worded dissent
Justice Brennan indicated

his view that the majority was asking
too much of the petitioners.
First of all, he felt that the permit
statute was

unconstitutional because it conferred unfettered
discretion
on local officials to grant or deny permits.
Secondly,

to require Walker and his colleagues to
challenge the in-

junction in court would result in delaying the protest.

And for Brennan, "The ability to exercise protected protest
at a time when such exercise would be effective must be as

protected as the beliefs themselves

"•'-^^
.

Justice Brennan also attacked the validity of the in-

junction itself.

It had been issued ex parte

Brennan con-

.

siders such a procedure an invalid prior restraint on expression, more dangerous to speech than statutes

"'"^^
.

In short. Justice Brennan would have permitted Walker

and his colleagues to speak first and challenge the permit
law later had they been prosecuted under it.

Instead, the

-jority had permitted
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the Imposition of an
improper pri or

restraint under an overbroad
statute.
In Brennan's view
overbreadth also justifies
relaxation of rules which inhibit
litigation of

constitutional

claims in federal courts.

He has made that view
clear in
Dombrowski v. PfisterlS^ which,
although not dealing withlimitation of demonstrations,
established principles which
were at issue in two cdi^es
cases''-^^ th»r
i
that did involve
protest activities.

A civil rights organization
filed suit in a federal
district court seeking an injunction
against its prose-

cution for alleged violation of
Louisiana sedition laws.
It charged that the laws were
overbroad and therefore

in-

valid on their face and that prosecution
was threatened only
to dissuade it from civil rights
activities.
The district
court held to the doctrine of abstention.
That doctrine
maintains that a federal court should avoid
resolving unclear questions of state law when resolution
of those ques-

tions by state courts might dispose of the
constitutional

question.

Justice Brennan, writing for the maj ority

"'•^^
,

held

that the district court's reliance on abstention was
mis-

placed.

Prosecutions under an overbroad statute had a

"chilling effect" on freedom of expression.

Given the

fragile nature of that right all those subject to such laws

could not be required to test their rights by risking prosecution.

In addition, Brennan saw the record as indicating
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harrass^ent of the petitioners
by state officials seeking
to
discourage civil rights
activities.
That constituted sufficient irreparable
ininrv
^r^ set ^
F
injury to
aside recourse to abstention.
Justice Brennan summarized
his view
•

i

as follows:

abstention

doctrine is inappropria?i%nr^
^statutes are justifiably atY-.fy
tacked on
'

their face as abridging f^e
expression, or as applied for
the purpose of
discouraging protected activities 188
.

Yet Justice Brennan seems to
have limited the reach
of this rule three years
later in his Cameron^^^ ^^^^^^^^
That case involved black pickets
marching in front of a
courthouse in Mississippi.
For several months they had
done
so with the permission of local
officials.
The state legislature then passed an anti-picketing
statute which forbade
all picketing that "unreasonably"
interfered with ingress
or egress from public buildings. The
day after passage of
the statute local officials read it to the
pickets and

ordered them to leave.

When the demonstrators appeared the

next day they were arrested.

In district court the law was

challenged as void on its face due to vagueness and overbreadth.

The pickets also sought an injunction against fur-

ther enforcement, alleging that their arrest was part of a

bad faith plan of selective enforcement for the purpose of
harrassment, with no expectation of securing convictions.
The district court rejected their contentions.
As one source has indicated,

'"^'^

Justice Brennan 's

opinion here was not inconsistent with his Dombrowski
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ruling.

He had held there that
abstention was inappropriate
xf the challenged law
was either overbroad
or there was evidence of bad faith enforcement.
But for Justice Brennan
neither element was present
in Cameron.
The law was neither
vague nor overbroad. ^^l
^^^^^^
case any evidence of bad
faith enforcement.
Brennan recognized that proper enforcement
of this valid law could
have a
chilling effect on protected
expression but for him that in
itself did not render the law
unconstitutional.
This was so,
Brennan said, because the statute
sought to regulate picket-'
ing, a form of conduct
intertwined with expression. When
such conduct constitutes an
unreasonable obstruction to free
access to public buildings it may
be properly limited even
thought it is related to protected
expression.
It seems to me that what Justice
Brennan did in

Cameron was to relax the Dombrowski rule
in light of the
Court's decision in Cox v. Louisiana
Two elements of
Cox are particularly relevant to Cameron.
The majority in
Cox held that communication by conduct did
not enjoy the
same protection as communication by "pure
speech. ""'•^^
.

Throughout his Cameron opinion, Justice Brennan stressed
the
conduct of the plaintiffs.
Yet that element alone is not
enough to explain Brennan 's narrow reading of Dombrowski

.

Conduct was a part of all the demonstrations Brennan dealt

w ith, and Cameron

is the only instance in which he would per-

mi t limitation of the protest.

ment of the Cox ruling which

I

But there is a second ele-

believe to be the major
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unart.culated precise of
Justice Brennan's Csueron
opinion
In cox the court upheld
the constitutionality
of a state law
prohibiting demonstrations In
front of court houses.
Justice
Goldberg stated that such laws
were in support of the
states
interest in protecting the
judicial process and that
demonstrations "inherently
^LiL.x_y thrpa^oT^"
t-u-^^194
LUi-eatien
that
process.

The

demonstration at issue in Carneron
was also conducted in front
of a courthouse.
I believe that in
the final analysis it was
this fact which caused Justice
Brennan to pull back from the
Dombrowski ruling. While one can
view the Mississippi AntiPicketing statute as neither vague nor
overbroad in its
ter-

minology, it takes very little
perception to understand the
purpose of passage of such a law
during a major voting
rights drive by civil rights organizations.
Clearly, the
goal was to stifle expression of
unpopular
views.

But

Justice Brennan put that consideration aside
because he accepted,
est,

it seems to me,

the assertion of a valid state inter-

protection of the judicial process, as automatically

validating the application of a law passed in support
thereof.

This is precisely the approach he so effectively
at-

tacked in Uphaus

v.

Wyman

Justice Brennan'

s

^'^^
.

opinions in cases involving demon-

strations indicate a generally broad view of the right to
express protest through conduct.

The one significant excep-

tion would seem to be a limitation he would permit on ob-

structive picketing of court houses.

That exception aside.
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he would not permit limitation
effected by overbroad

statutes nor would he allow
punishment of demonstrators
whose words do not incite to
violence but simply offend
those who hear them.

Denial of Benefits
The cases examined in this section
deal with loyalty
programs designed to deny government
benefits to alleged

subversives.

Five of the seven opinions
Justice Brennan
wrote in these cases deal with issues
only remotely
con-

nected to freedom of expression

The two remaining

.

opinions, however, emphasize Brennan's
insistence that

statutes employed to regulate speech must
be precise.
The California constitution required that
tax exemptions be denied to any person who advocated
violent overthrow of the state or federal government or
who advocated
support of a foreign government engaged in
hostilities with
the United States.
As a result, the state legislature

passed a law requiring property tax exemption claimants
to
sign an oath on their tax return stating that they did
not

engage in the proscribed advocacy.

State courts ultimately

upheld the constitutional provision and the exemption statute
against challenges that each constituted a denial of freedom
of speech v/ithout due process of law.
the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall

The issues reached
^^'^
.

Justice Brennan's lead opinion focused on the procedure

established by the California law.

For him, the unconstitu-
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t.onaI Vice of ,Hat
procedure was that it
imposed the burden
of proof on the individual
to demonstrate that
his speech
was not the advocacy
proscribed by the law.
Brennan felt
that the result of that
burden would be that
The man who knows he must
proof and persuade another bring forth
of
ness of his conduct necessarilythe lawful
must steer
far wider of the unlawful
zone than i| '^'^^
the
State must bear these burdens. 198

Ultimately then. Justice Brennan
felt that the failure of
the state to provide more
"sensitive tools" with which
to
distinguish between protected and
unprotected expression
would have a chilling effect on
speech shielded by the First
Amendment.
That same chilling effect might
be produced by laws
whose substance did not clearly
state what is proscribed.
In holding four provisions of
the New York loyalty program
void for vagueness,
j^^^^^^ Brennan indicated
that the

intricacy and complexity of the program
coupled with the ambiguity of terms such as "seditious"
stifled the academic
freedom of teachers required to sign a loyalty
oath as a condition of employment.
For Brennan, academic freedom is a

particular concern of the First Amendment, of
"transcendant
value" to all of society.
Justice Brennan 's Keyishian opinion also held that a
teacher could not be dismissed for mere membership in an

organization with illegal goals even if the faculty member
had knowledge of those goals.

It must be shown that the
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teacher himself had specific
intent to co^it illegal
acts
in pursuit of the
organization's ai.s.
Coupled with Justice
Brennan-s ruling in the S^eiser
case, this meant that
the
state had the burden to prove
in each case
that the al-

legedly subversive individual
intended to
acts before he could be
dismissed.

coimi^it

illegal

Justice Brennan's repeated
demand, reflected in the
two opinions discussed and in
his voting in the cases
not examined, is for precision in the
laws seeking to deny
benefits
on the basis of alleged disloyalty.
The interplay between
Speiser and Keyishian is the
culmination of
this insistence.

When the two cases are taken together,
Justice Brennan very
strongly implies that a loyalty-security
program is only
permissible under two conditions. First,
the proscribed expression must be precisely defined by
the law.

Secondly, an

employee cannot be dismissed for disloyalty
unless the state
has employed procedures akin to those
required of it prior
to the imposition of criminal sanctions.

In short both sub-

stance and procedure must be precise in recognition
of the
fragile nature of freedom of expression.

Miscellaneous Cases
One of the most important freedom of expression cases
to arise during Justice Brennan'

the Pentagon Papers case.^^^

s

tenure on the Court was

The Nixon administration

sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post

from further publication of the Pentagon Papers, a history

of American involvement
in Indochina which was
written under
government auspices. The
Ee^^uriam opinion of the Court
held that the government had
failed to meet the heavy
burden
of justifying the imposition
of a prior restraint on
the

press.

In addition to that opinion,

there were nine others
handed down, six concurring and
three dissent.
Justice Brennan's concurrence
made it emphatically
clear what he considered the only
condition under which a
prior restraint could be imposed
on protected

expression.

That condition existed in a very
narrow class of cases and
only when the nation was at war.
In order that a restraint
be justified, Brennan would require
that there was ample,

clear evidence that publication would
"inevitably lead to an
event kindred to endangering the safety
of a troop ship."

But the government's case here was
premised on the view that
publication of the Papers "might" endanger
national security.
In Justice Brennan' s view
the First Amendment tolerates absolutely
no prior judicial restraints of the press
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that
untoward consequences may result.

Consequently, Brennan felt that every restraint permitted
in
the case,

for whatever reason, had violated the First Amend-

ment.

Justice Brennan'

s

view here is perfectly consistent

with his earlier discussions of prior restraint in the obscenity cases. 202

He indicated there that a temporary brief

restraint could be imposed while a determination of whether
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a challenged

work was in fart
tact oKc..
obscene, that is unprotected
expression, was being .ade.
But here, where the
material
was clearly protected
expression, he viewed the
First Amendment as permitting
xuLing "pKco1,,+F
absolutely"n no prior restraint.
t

The three remaining cases^Oa

^^.^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

demonstrate what Justice Brennan
views as the reach of
the
concept of freedom of expression.
In the Button case Justice
Brennan dealt with

Virginia's attempt to apply its
law forbidding solicitation
of legal business to the
N.A.A.C.P.
He found the state law
vague and overbroad because it
could be applied to the
N.A.A.C.P. -s efforts to advocate
legal action to assert the
rights of blacks.
Constitutional protection. Brennan said,
extends not only to activities which
can be classified within a "narrow literal conception"
of freedom of speech but
also to other forms of political
expression including litigation.

Concurring in Lamont

v.

Postmaster General

.

Justice

Brennan expressed an even broader view of the
rights protected by the First Amendment.
In a tone similar

to that of

Justice Douglas in the Griswold case,^°^ Justice
Brennan
stated
the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from
congressional abridgement those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful 205
.

This view is of course consistent with Brennan 's overall ju-
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dxcial activism.

In a sense he stands
ready to "create"

rights in order to augment
the stipulated guarantees
of the
Bill of Rights.

The final case in this group is
one of the clearest
statements Justice Brennan has made
as to the overall system
of expression he feels is
demanded by the First Amendment.
In C^B^ V. Democratic National
Committ.. Justice Brennan
dissented from the majority view that
broadcasters had the
right to refuse to sell air time
to those wishing to speak
out on public issues.

balancing what I perceive to be the compet3-ng interests of broadcasters
the
listening and viewing public, and individuals seeking to express their views
over the
electronic media, I can only conclude that
the exclusionary policy upheld today can
serve only to inhibit, rather than further
our profound national commitment to
the
principle that debate on public issues^sbould
be uninhibited, robust and wide open.'^^^
For Justice Brennan, then, the First Amendment
demands a

marketplace of ideas.
right of access. 207

would be limited.

What he would require is a limited
He does not specify how that right

But he would have the Court read the

First Amendment as protecting both the right to hear
debate

and the right to participate therein.

While Justice Brennan'

s

view here is theoretically

laudable there is one rather considerable practical problem.
In order for there to exist any right to access someone,

most probably the government, will have to tell broadcasters
what to put on the air.

That would seem to me to be a more

serious First Amendment
problem than that Justice
Brennan
raises.
As he himself said in his
Slaton^^S opinion it is
not the government's business
to tell people what they
should read or hear
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A CONCLUDING NOTE
At the time of this writing
William Brennan has
served on the Supreme Court
for 18 years, the second
longest tenure of the Justices
presently sitting.
During that
period he has been a consistent
proponent of a very
vigorous system of freedom of
expression.

His views, as ex-

pressed in the cases examined in
this study, can be discussed in terms of several different
elements.

The most critical element is
Justice Brennan' s belief
that freedom of expression plays
the primary role in defining the nature of the American
system.
For him, that
freedom insures that the people have
the means to govern
themselves.
It provides both the right to
check the government through criticism and the flow of
information
the

people require if they are to criticize
intelligently.
Justice Brennan does not view the First
Amendment as

But

shielding only that expression which deals
with public
issues.

Rather, he views freedom of expression
extending to

all matters in which the prople are interested.

Given Brennan'

s

view of freedom of expression as

being of paramount value, one might then expect him to
insist on an absolute, literal reading of the First Amendment

admonition that "Congress shall make no law.
speech.

.

regarding

But he consistently rejects that approach in favor

of the more flexible case-by-case balancing of freedom of

expression against competing interests.

At the same time he

brings to the balancing
technique a strong bias in
favor of
expression and against any
limitation.
For Justice Brennan
to permit an attempt to
regulate expression,
that limitation must be xmposed in
support of a clearly
identifiable
interest which is more important
than exnression given
the

particular circumstances of the
specific case.
Further he
requires that there be compelling
evidence that limiting expression is the only method whereby
a competing interest
can
be protected.
Justice Brennan also insists
that the means
chosen to impose restrictions on
expression meet
rigorous

standards.

The language of the law must
be precise and the
procedures it utilizes carefully designed
and executed.
This reflects Justice Brennan' s
demand that limitations on
expression be carried out with tools
sensitive enough to
separate protected from unprotected
expression.

While Brennan has been generally consistent
in maintaining the views discussed to this point
there are
two

notable inconsistencies.

The first is of course his rejec-

tion of the balancing technique in his
obscenity decisions.
In Roth and its progeny Brennan fails to
weight competing

interests and instead simply labels one type of expression

"unprotected."

As has been pointed out,^°^ it is my view

that this is a result of a universal inability to identify
what,
sion.

if any,

interest is being damaged by obscene expres-

The second inconsistency occurs in Brennan'

opinion.

s

Cameron

In that case he disregarded the circumstances of

the case and placed
protection of the judicial
process above
the particular for. of
expression employed. One
can only

hypothesize that Justice Brennan's
view here is a result of
his personal sensitivity
to the demands of the
judicial process.

But that of course does not
make it any the less inconsistent with his general
approach.

Justice Brennan's balancing of
the "transcendent
value" of freedom of speech
against other values is also
significant as an expression of his
judicial activism.
Brennan believes that the protection
of First Amendment
rights is the primary responsibility
of the judiciary and
ultimately of the Supreme Court.
Consequently, he is quite
willing to employ the power of the
Court to vindicate freedom of expression where he sees it
threatened.
His activism
also leads him to supplement the literal
commands
of the

First Amendment with additional guarantees,
like the right
to access, which he feels are required
if that Amendment is
to be fully employed.

Justice Brennan's liberal activist views were of significant influence in shaping First Amendment law during

the

Warren court period.
and libel. 210

Thus was particularly true in obscenity

In the former, Justice Brennan formulated

the R oth test which became the focal point around which the

obscenity debate was conducted both within the Court and in
society in general.

Between 1957, the year of his appoint-

ment to the Court, and 1968 when the Court began to experience personnel changes. Justice Brennan wrote the majority
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or lead opinion in eleven
of the sixteen signed
obscenity
decisions handed down.
If we make a gross count
of the
votes in each case, considering
only agreement and disagreement with the conclusion of
Brennan's opinion, only one
case of the eleven, Ginzbur^,
was marked by a 504 division
of the Court.
In short, Brennan was able
to gain support
for his conclusions of at
least six members of the Court
in
ten of the eleven obscenity
opinions he .^ote.
But the
gross count does give a misleading
impression as to his persuasiveness.
By examining concurrences and
dissents one
gets a somewhat different view of
the interaction within
the Court.
The most consistent writers of
concurring
'

opinions were Justices Black and Douglas.

They concurred

six times, either when Brennan held a
particular work not
obscene or when he voided a censorship
procedure.
They
reached the same result he did but from their
own view that
the First Amendment imposes an absolute
prohibition against

expression except when it is an inseparable part of
illegal
action.

Their dissents came first when Brennan either held

that obscenity was outside the protection of the First

Amendment

(

Roth ) and later when he upheld the conviction of

sellers of obscene materials

Ginsberg )

.

(

Ginzburg

,

Mishkin

,

and

The most consistent dissenter was Mr. Justice

Harlan, who disagreed with Brennan 's finding in seven of
the eleven cases.

Harlan's disagreement with Brennan is

essentially over the role of the Court with respect to state
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actxvxty in obscenity
censorship.
Harlan would li.it the
court by allowing the
states to enforce different
obscenity
standard and censorship
procedures as long as they
were
-reasonable." He sees the
states as having the primary
responsibility for the regulation
of morality and feels
the
Court should act as only a
passive check on "irrationality."
Justice Brennan, however, has
viewed the Court as having
the
major responsibility for
establishing an obscenity standard
and censorship procedure, since
questions involving expression raise constitutional issues
which he feels are primarily
the Supreme Court's concern.
Consequently, he has not hesitated to strike down state laws
when they don't square with
the uniform requirements established
by the Court.

Justice Brennan'

Justice Warren.

s

most consistent supporter was Chief

The Chief Justice joined ten of the
eleven

obscenity opinions written by Brennan.

His sole dissent

came in the Jacobellis decision because,
among other things,
he felt the lower courts had acted reasonably
in finding the

cited film obscene.

Warren's general support of Brennan was

given despite the Chief Justice's view that obscenity
cases
should focus on the actions of the people involved rather
than on the contents of the book or film.

Brennan did not

explicitly accept this concept of variable obscenity until
the Ginzburg and Mishkin cases in 1966.

Given his own distaste for obscenity censorship then,

Justice Brennan had a relatively consistent three man bloc

supporting him-Warren, Black
and Douglas.
The same bloc
supported his five majority/lead
opinions in libel.
What then can be said regarding
Justice Brennan's
"leadership"
of cue
or
thp ^nT1T•^?
t*P
Court?
It seems to me that
leadership
in this context is of two
dimensions: the creation of a
stable bloc of Justices through
the persuasiveness of one
of the bretheren's opinions;
secondly, the shaping of basic
doctrines of constitutional law.
One cannot credit Justice
Brennan with creating the liberal
activist bloc
on the

Warren Court.

It was there when he assumed
his seat.

Further, Black and Douglas most often
concurred in Brennan' s

decision rather than accepted his reasoning.

At the

s>ame

time it must be recognized that neither
Justice Black nor
Justice Douglas, given their absolutism,
could have at-

tracted the fifth vote needed for a majority.

Justice

Brennan then can be credited with going far
enough towards
the Black/Douglas position to hold their
concurrence while

maintaining the flexibility needed to attract the
additional
vote(s) needed to maintain a majority.
It is in the second area of leadership,

shaping the law, that

greatest influence.

I

that of

feel Justice Brennan has had the

In both obscenity and libel, Justice

Brennan's views have established the framework within which
the respective legal issues were examined.

The Roth test

in obscenity and the actual malice rule in libel are still

the starting points in dealing with those First Amendment
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problems even the Burger Court,
embarking on a proclaimed
new direction in obscenity
censorship, has anchored its

position in Roth

"^^^
.

By virtue of his ability to
sustain a majority behind
his views Justice Brennan has
played perhaps the major role
in shaping the Court's position
on two important free expression issues. And his efforts in both
areas have been directed towards facilitating the free
interchange of ideas he
feels so essential to the operation of
the American system.

The changes in the personnel of the Court
which have
taken place over the past six years will serve
to limit

Justice Brennan'

s

leadership.

President Nixon's four ap-

pointments, all judicial conservatives, have formed a
solid
bloc which is generally less favorably inclined toward First

Amendment claims than Brennan.

Consequently, Justice Brennan

will frequently dissent as he did in the Slaton and Miller
cases
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differ whether the material is obscene." (354 U.S. 436,
In short, if a judge is uncertain as to whether a
448).
challenged work is obscene, he should be required to call
for a jury since it is best equipped to apply the Roth
test.
But Justice Brennan never again raised the jury
issue in any of the subsequent obscenity cases and in fact
the issue is brought up only once again, in Chief Justice
Warren's dissent, which Brennan joined, in Times Film v.
Chicago 365 U.S. 43, 68-69 (1961).

m

.

"^^380 U.S.

51 (1965).
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41
42

356 U.S. 43 (1961).

Justice Brennan would permit the cpn^or- c^>-^o^
latitude when fU^s ra?her"han\"k
^^n^erS^d^'l^^'
''"^''^ inconceivable that
Brennln
°S"d
^^^-lq pemij
permit,
for
tor instance, any government ^iP^no^^ ^r^
to their sale.
At\he same t^mr'"^
thrSta^°°^'
""^^
quire advance submission of all fnini;
effectively to bar all'^howings of
(Freedman v. Maryland 380 U.S 51, 'u^proLcted' f Umf^'^^^^
58 (1965))

"Lf
"

-:

'

"

43

'

^''''^
federal administrative censorshin
T^^uIn his Man^a^EnterH^ opinion
(370 U.S. 478 495-519
(1962) Justice Brennan states that the proper
r^adiL of
Congressional intent in giving the Post
Office
control
over obscene mail is that that
Department "
could ston
obviously questionable matter for^he
purpose of t^ansmlt-^
prosecuting authorities, could stop matte?
\'
a^"^"^ ^^"^ "S^^^' and'couJd Lvest!gaL matt^r'sPnt
2^ b' persons previously convicted and if
the matter were found violative, could
prosecuting authorities" (370 U.S. 478, present it to the
503)
Again the
^fter a judicial
WrL^^''^^'?Q7?''''TP^°?^^^^
Justice Brennan
Of?y^2^;.n
Z^^^;,defective for its specifically held Post
Office
procedure
failure to bomport with
his Freedman requirements.
See Bloun t v. Rizzi 400 U S
410, particularly 417-422 (1971)":
.

m ^LT

'

44

o

^- Midel 402 U.S. 351 (1971) and U.S. v.
H;^Photographs^02 U.S. 363 (1971).

37
—

^^394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"^^Ibid.

,

p.

564.

^^"402 U.S.

351, 355

48
^°402 U.S.

363 (1971).

49

(1971).

Of course in 37 Photos Brennan did not require precision
in the procedures of the Customs
Bureau.
Justice White's
opinion, in discussing the procedures employed, seems to
give every benefit of the doubt to the censor.
The time
limits he interprets federal law as requiring are as
follows:
judicial proceedings must commence against the
cited material within 14 days of seizure by Custom's
agents; that judicial process must be completed within 60
days.
In short, under those guidelines it could take almost two and a half months before material seized by the
government was permanently held or released. Justice
Brennan had consistently called for "prompt judicial determination." I cannot conceive of his permitting state or
.

federal
"normal
s temmin
50

51
52

53
54

413 U.

s.

15

(1973).

413 U. s.

49

(1973).

354 u.

476 (1957), see above, p. 2-5.

s.

378 u. s.

184 (1964).

383 u. s. 413 (1966),

see above p.

6-7.

55

Of course this may very well have
been Brennan's intention.
56
413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
57
58

59

378 U.S.
Ibid., p.

184 (1964).
191 (underlining mine)

There are numerous questions which might
be posed as a result of the semantics of this alteration.
Are only those
forms of expression which are "serious"
protected by the
First Amendment? If a form of expression is
of
value does it not thereby possess social value? serious
Isn't
frivolous expression sometimes valuable?
See above, p.

3-4.

^"It should be noted that Burger's use of the balancing approach is not the usual case by case weighing of a specific obscene expression against a specific interest.
Rather he strikes what constitutes a final balance against
all obscene expression.
In this sense, the only difference ^between his approach and Brennan's is that the Chief
Justice identifies the interests he feels outweigh obscene
expression.

^^413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
63

U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Report, 1970
(New York: Bantam Books, 1970) p. 32.
And even Burger's
o\m source, the Hill-Link report, does not at all claim
that exposure to obscenity is the sole cause of antisocial behavior or that it is the state's interest in preventing such behavior that justifies censorship of the obscene.
"The inference from this statement, i.e., pornography is harmless, is not only insupportable on the
slanted evidence presented; it is preposterous. How isolate one factor and say it causes or does not cause criminal behavior? How determine that one book or one film

caused one man to commit
rape or murrfpr? 4
life goes into one criminal
entire
n„
said to have caused that
act
Th""^ government
est in regulating porno?ranhv
interha^
to the prevention
primarily
ormoSrcorruotfon'T/^^"^'*
vention of overt cri™i°^?^^?raSf
°Snduct"°! '° .^^'^ P'^^"

/

64,

413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973)

65

^^Ibid.
67

68

Ibid.

,

p.

431.

,

p.

434.

The New York Court of Appeals has
already acted
In
Peo^ V. Heller (joined for decision
wi^h Peopie I

the appellate courts"

[33^

2nd 3U 3^6
the
First
Amendment
will
will .i;-n
still vary according to state lines.
Further part of
rationale for permitting thls'^ariation
"l'^'?.^""??^^
^^ither realistic nor constitutionally sound
r.i^ f-l i
requiring depiction of condn
r^'ut^^^^'^^'^"^
"^^^ ^5^^"'
N^^^
City" [413
S
U
U.^.
iT'^i?
15, 32 nti?,]^
(1973)].
One wonders if it is any more "realistic or constitutionally sound" to require
that
people of New York City accept depiction of that the
found
tolerable
Potsdam, New York.

r^QT^^f

""^^^^

if

J

m

69c:
bee

uhis opinions

m

Roth v. U.S. 354 U.S 476 (1957)Manual Enterprises v. Day 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Bantam B
ooks
V. Sullivan 372 U.S. 58 (1964); A Quantity of
Books v.
(1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts 383
U^S^^413^(1966)

^^413 U.S. 49, 84 (19 73).
Justice Brennan's concern that
protected expression not be suppressed along with the obscene was the major reason that he imposed rigorous procedural requirements on the censor as well as insisting
that a work be totally devoid of social value before it
could be censored.

71

100
.

Ibid
Brennan also pointed out th;,f- t-K
p. 478.
there was
considerable disagreement wi>h-in
?
"^"""^
That divergence iL the Court
curriam decisions in 31 casp^ he said^'^n""'"^^''^ Per
contribut^to the
tei^^ between counts s?ncr;h. q
viding little guidanc^ to"Jower%ou?tr
P^^"

^

72
73

Ibid.

,

p.

481

\^ile Justice Brennan clearly feels th;:th
serious problem with Burger's aoDroaoh
several others. He does^not feel

o

^
•

?hat'it'wInT''''

P^r^^bi::7 '^,T..^t-^^^^^^

Lrm^ii?L;s^i;a^^rx

s?ti:^:trL^?fio^if ^:%bat
IS obscene in the hands of
the Supreme Coirt

^^413 a.S. 49, 83 (1973).
'^^^^ ^ ^^^^^ ^^g^^ Umlt obscen^i^^
preventing
anti-social behavior.
There .-^
is little empirical evidence, he
feels, demonstrating a connection between exposure and
even if sufficient evidence did so indicate,action and
should concentrate on punishment of the actionthe state
and on
cation.
Nor should the state be permitted to regulate eduexpression in the interest of controlling the morality
of
thought;
... if a state may, in an effort to maintain
or create a particular moral tone, prescribe
what its
citizens cannot read or cannot see, then it would seem
to
follow that
pursuit of the same objective a State
could decree that its citizens must read certain books or
must view certain films."
[413 U.S. 49, 110 (1973)].

^^?t^?^^^^^?''^'

m

76

Justice Brennan explicitly disclaims rendering any view as
to the extent of state power to regulate the exposure of
obscenity to juveniles and unconsenting adults [413 U.S
49,

77

114, N.

29 (1973)3.

Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). When this case
was decided Justice Brennan did not join the majority but
instead joined Justice Stewart's concurrence which was
based on narrower grounds than that of the majority
opinion.

78

'°413 U.S. 49, 85, N.

79

9

(1973).

For instance, the meaning of the label "adult film" would
be quickly understood without being in and of itself
offensive.

80

101

New York, MacMillan, 1967

Uregon Laws, 1971,

^ee.

Ibid

.

sect.

,

c

74"^

qq

t
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255

^^Ibid., 255- (5).
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Kuh, Foolish Figleaves ?
In his dissent

Ar-^

.

p.

2 75.

m

Slaton, Justice Douglas comments
"I an
Brennan to fo^^ake the low
ri^"?
road which the Court has followed
in this flJT
regime he would inaugurate is much
closer than the old't^
^^^^^ Amendment proClaims. •''^4^^"^%''^^'°^f
•c^IiSs
[^ij U.S
49, 72 (1973)].

^

^^^^
^- M^tteo 360 U.S.
564 nqsS^''T'/''
(1959); Wood v. "^n^'
Georgia 370 U.S. ^75 (19 62) N ew York
Times_Co. v. Sulliva n 376 U.S. 254 (1964)Garris^ v
Louisiana

379-pTT4

(1965)

Rosenblatt

;

v.

(1964);

Her^

Baer 383 U.S.

v'

75

•

i

llS^U

(1966)

•

S

iU49 (1970); Greenbelt Cooper ative Publishing
Assoc
398
401 U.S. 265 y(1971); Time "^.^a^e 401 U.S. 279 (1971)O cala Star Banner Co v. Damron 401 U.S.
295 (1971).

s7^-a97orrikt^^^

!St^'

356

.

Ashton v
v

—

.

87

TimeJLnc. v. Hill 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Curtis Publ ishing
Company v. Butts 588 U.S. 130 (1967); A ssocia ted Press v
Walker 388 U.S. 130 (1967); St. Amant v. Thompson~390~U S
727 (1968); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
.

S8„

brennan

•

?

tive majority/lead opinions were New Yor k Times
Co_^ V. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana
379 U.S. 64 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer 383 U.S. 75 (1966)
Time Inc. v. Hill 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Ro senbloom v.
Metromedia 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
In addition, he was probably the author of the per curiam opinion in Henry v.
Collins 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
That opinion is simply a restatement of Brennan's opinions in New York Times and

Garrison

s

.

^^376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90

The ad was sponsored by the Committee to Defend Martin
Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South.
Sullivan's suit was based on two paragraphs in the ad:
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Again and again the Southern
violators
have answered Dr. King's
peacef uIprotesL
wxth xntmidation and violence.
They have
Child.
They have assaulted his person.
Thev
have arrested him seven times-for
'speeding'
loitering' and similar 'offenses.'
And nSw
they have charged him with
'perjury '-a felony
under which they could imprison
him for ten
years.
(376 U.S. 254, 257-258 [1964]).
'

91

^^^ested four times, not seven
The stu^I'J^^u^J'^'^ ^^^2
^'^^ '° reregister but instead had boy
tTrlc, classes
t"'''^
cotted
for one day.
They were protesting the exsitting^in at a funch
loulilr
counter-the
'thr"'"'i
expulsion did not result from a demonstration
at the capitol.
None of the students,
?hose
without meal tickets, were barred from excepting
the din?ng haU
Police were present near the campus but
did not ^rinc^"'it
92

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Californi a
l^t
J66 n^r%A^/fo^Vr^
U.S. 36 (1961); Times Film Corpo ration v ^-;^y ..f
Roth v^ United StaEFTm U.S.
C^961)
J/b (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois 343 U.S. 250 nqs?^Pennekamp y. Florida 328 U. ST-33rTl946) Chaplinsky
New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Near v. Minnesota v.
283
U.b. 697 (1931).
;

'

;

^^376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
94
"^^376
95

U.S.

254,

Ibid., p. 273, quoting Craig v. Harney 331 U.S.
(1947)

^^Ibid.

,

p.

273.

^'^Ibid.

,

p.

276.

98

270 (1964).
367,

376

376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
Justice Brennan cited
Coleman v. MacLennan 78 Kan. 711 (1908), as the precedent
case for this rule

103

99

"^360 U.S.

564 (1959).

Brennan dissented in Barr
complaining that th.

•

•

'^^'^^ allegedly defamatory statements hr.t t^'fK-™
it achieves this at the
of letting the citizen who
cost
^^^motives
withou^^r:Sedy'?"^%^m^

ZT.

This point is discussed below
at p

.

%T <^l,T'''

46

102

"^^^

"^^^^

Times Case:
^^""l^
^^l^""""'Central
Meaning of the First AmpnHmAr.^'
^^^^^^^

Review (1964), p. 192? I93
103p
barr is on v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 64
(1964)
104t.
Ibid.

p.

,

72,

,

A Note on 'Thp
^he
" c
Supreme Court

note. 8.

105 c:
1,
See nGinzbur^
v. uoldwater 396 U.S. 1049
(1970), below
JO
P
•

'

'

.

106
^^^^'^>Specific extension
ofi^hM.-;
V'^to ^^"^^
of
the Times rule
criminal libel took place in Garrison
V. Louisiana 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
^

^

Emerson, The System of Freedom of Exp rps...-! on
(New
York: Random House, 19/0)
p. 39lT

"-^Thomas

,

108

As long as the falsity is "accidental" and not
calculated
or reckless.

'°^379 U.S. 64, 75
(1964).
'•'^The lecture,

given on 14 April 1964, was published as

William Brennan, "The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment," Harvard Law Review
70

(1965), p.

I bid

112

.

p.

,

1-20.

—

11.

That is, obscenity before his Slaton opinion.

'•'^403 U.S.

^^^Ibid.

p.

,

78-87 (1971).

29,
79.

^^^See Edmund Cahn, "Justice Black and First Amendment
'Absolutes':
A Public Interview," New York University Laxv^
R eview 37 (1962),
p. 549-561, particularly at 557-558.
,

^^^383 U.S.

75

(1966)

'

Ibid.

,

p.

85.

Ibid.

,

p.

86-87, n. 13.

"''l^^
he has

fallToll

IT^l^;'^

-ling that

^^^^^

in'f4crno'respSL?Sl?ur"'

"^ifh

120

lege^in his disLnt in

BarrT^Sy^%^o'u't""44!%^S"

121^
Garrison v. Louisiana 379 U.S.
64, 74 (1964).

J^'exemplary
ir^v^^ as
5

tI^i^

oiartPr^v
uarterly

Q

,

Brennan cites Pedrick's
^2'
of the improper analogy
See

^

"

J^^^'^^^ion, Cornell Law
2 Jr^""^^
(1964),
p. 581-608 particu larly 590-5 91

a
49q'^n

grounds the
second or^hich''""'"'''^^ the proposition
that
since pub^^^^L..'^^^''^
lic officials, and particularly high
public officials
are privileged as regards the law of
libel to defame
citizens, there should be an analogous privilege
in the
citizenry to defame public officials,"
It is
p. 590
well to note, however, that Pedrick himself
rejects this
as an unsound basis for the Times rule,
preferrinc^ instead the Court's reliance on the First Amendment's
protection of public discussion.
See p. 591.
'

123
^-"383

U.S.

75,

^^^85

U.S.

374 (1967).

388 U.S.
cision.

130 (1967).

125

85,

Note 10 (1966).

The two cases were joined for de-

"^^Quoted at 388 U.S. 130, 138,
^^^^388 U.S.

^^^

Ibid

130,

.

,

p.

152.

Ikid.

,

p.

154.

129

n.

3

(1967).

150-151 (1967).

^^°Ibid., p. 155.
131
The story in the Post was based upon a phone conversation
between Butts and Paul Bryant, the Alabama coach. Through

105

^-^Se Burnett,

Tl^^ir.^^^^^^^^^^

Je Sr^^r,e.^irre:?d^^o

Port^^^T..^;..^?KK^?f

tHe

viFtigatio>^t^^d:^:Si^ri?^Harlan, this constituted a failure
on the Da?t of
Post to make "a reasonable
investigation oftheunde?
lying facts" [Ti^ v.
385 U.S^ 374? 409 a967)!

MU

_

'"'mu'
nxii, Buttrand'walk^r-'s"'^
i3utts and Walker,
Supreme
^^^385 U.S.
134

•

135

374,

402-411 (1967).

^^^^

Court Review

.

Amendment:
1967, p.

See particularly p. 407-410

Kalven separates "assumption of risk of
publicity " which
I have called status of the
libellant, from the "^osli
"^he Reasonable
Man^-^n
Han,
^Qr'''^?^^''^'™^'''-"
It seems to me that these two
p. 298.
elements are
so closely related as to constitute a
single factor
A
public official, for instance, because of his
position
has
a very great possibility for counterargument.
R osenbloom v. Metromedia 403 U.S. 29,
66 (1971).

136^,

,

.

.

.

.

New York Times v. S ullivan 376 U.S.
o?n°?n^n^??^
2/U
(1964); Garrison v. Louisiana 379 US
64
74-75
(1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) 'lime
Inc^ v. Hill 385 U.S. 374, 387-388 (1957).
otf

z:)^\-,

•

137

138

139

See Douglas' opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer 383
91 (1966).

US

In 1968 the Court rendered its decision in St. Amant v
Thompson 390 U.S. 727. The case involved a libel award
to a public official for statements made about him in a
televised speech of a candidate for public office. The
issue in the case was simply whether the state court had
properly applied the Times rule. The Supreme Court,
through Justice White, held that the requisite degree of
actual malice was not present and reversed the state
court.
The vote was 8-1 with Justice Fortas dissenting
on the grounds that the allegedly libellous charges were
not made with reasonable care.

Rosenbloom

v.

Metromedia 403 U.S. 29 (1971).

^^^396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
^^^^

142

75
^'

Ginzburg

v.

Goldxvater 414 F 2d 324 (1969).

The jury did award Goldwater $1.00 in compensatory
damages

143

.

Justice Brennan may have votpd t-n a-rnr^n ^
case but without a fourth vofo n h
think that is the leasrUk^
y'pLsibluL'^lf
probable that Brennan was
convinced likp^;i. \
•

^^^^

•

ticularly since th^^pf ?Lioner°
R^loh

144

]45

Mmotor

146
•^"^^

Gr^en^^l^^eratlve
P atriot Co.

v.

Publishing,

r.n

1^3^^^

v.

—

^--n

par-

Bresler 398 U.S.

Ro^ 401 U.S. 265 (1971)

.

Time V. Pape 401 U.S. 279 (1971).

Ocala Star Banner Co.

v.

Damron 401 U.S. 295 (1971).

^^^403 U.S. 29 (1971).
•^^^

Ibid

.

^^^Ibid.
151
152
153

.

p.

41.

,

p.

52.

V.

California 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

Miller
P ans

Adult Theater

v.

Slaton 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

See Kaplan v. California 413 U.S. 115 (1973)- U S v
12_Films 413 U.S. 123 (1973); U.S. v. Orito 4ir'u7S 139
'

.

154
155

Roth V. United States 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

Harry Kalven, "The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment'," Supreme Court
Review, 1964, p. 191-221.

—

156
^^^

158

New York: Vintage Books, 1970.

New York Times
C B S
.

159

^^^

.

V.

v.

U.S.

403 U.S.

713 (1971).

Democratic National Committe e 412 U.S. 94 (1973)

This committee was originally called the House Un-American
Activities Committee.

Watkin s

v.

United States 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

161

Sweezey

v.

^^^360 U.S.

New Hampsh ire 354 U.S. 234
(1957).
82

72,

'"^''^^^ Frankfurter, Harlan, Whitaker

'''andTted^r??'
^^^360 U.S.

85

72,

(1959).

(1959).

^^^Dean Alfange Jr.. "The Balancing of
Interests in Fr^P
Speech Cases: In Defense of an Abused
Doct?ine^ Law
Law_j^
in
Transition Quarterly 2 (1965),
p. 35-63.
1°?'

^^^It^

S:rrw^: fxJo^S:?
^^^Ibid.
168^,

,

p.

^^^tice Brennan dissented be^^^^^^
mvest^Ia^t^on

126.

.

This view isperhaps most explicitly stated
by Justice
Frankfurter
Dennis v.
341 U.S. 494, at 54A-545 (1954)
In tact, that argument has been at least
strongly implied.
See Alexander Meiklejohn, "The Balancing of
Preservation Against Political Freedom," California Self
Law
Review, 49 (1961), p. 4-15.

m

U^

'^°372 U.S. 539
(1963).
171
Brennan wrote five opinions in this area: Brox^m v. Louisiana 383 U.S. 131 (1966, concurrence; Walker v. Birmingham
388 U.S. 307 (1967), dissent; Cameron v. Johnson 390 U.S.
611 (1968), majority opinion; Bachellar v. Maryland 397 U.S.
564 (1970), majority opinion; Gooding v. Wilson 405" U.S.
518 (1972), majority opinion.
The first three cases
arose from civil rights demonstrations while Bachellor and
Gooding dealt with protests against American involvement
in Indochina.
172

Harry Kalven, "The Concept of Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana," Supreme Court Review (1965), p. 1-33.
.

173

Cameron v. Johnson 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968), quoting
Justice Goldberg' s majority opinion in Cox v. Louisiana
379 U.S.

559,

563 (1965).

of the cases Justice Brennan dealt with in this area
concerned state government attempts to limit demonstra-

^'''^'"All

tions
175

.

There are two cases in which Justice Brennan overturned
convictions of anti war demonstrators on the grounds that

108
they did not employ "fiahtinfr r^o-rric"
Those cases are Bachellor v m!^ ? /oo^^''^'' protest,
397 U.S. 564 (1970)
and Gooding v. Wlff^H^
In the latter
case^FiHHfn heTdThit state ;o^li? P^^^)
^''P''^^^^^^"
°f ^
statute was overbroad becanL ?^ ^ ^
^^^^^^^^
cation of the statute
tr^^Sting^wordf
•

-;

^•3Mand

.

•

basically this is the dif f icul ^v i-hat i . a i ^Justice Brennan
to reject his own and the Courtis
effor^^
obscenity censorship.
hrpoi^t:'

\n hirs^^fon"'

ILli

^

i

s?on from
sion
rrom
^'^'^383

U.S.

P- 26)) the-CBir?t was simply
"""^"^ °? separating obscene expr^s^ expression.
llTrtrt
protected

131 (1966).

^It is also true that the Louisiana law
at issue here was
overbroad in Cox v. Louisiana 379
U
S '?3l
U.b.
536 n^s?''^^^^^
(19o5).
Brennan felt that that fact alone required reversal of the Brown convictions.
'^^388 U.S. 307 (1967).
180
Public Safety Commissioner "Bull" Connor was the official
to whom application was made.
See Chief Justice Warren's
dissent [388 U.S. 307, 324-325 (1967)] for a description
of Connor s involvement in this case.
181
Justice Brennan did not explicitly make this point in his
dissent.
Chief Justice Warren had done so and Brennan
joined that dissent.

•^2388 U.S. 307, 349 (1967).
183.

.

.

Again, this is consistent with his view that the procedures employed to limit expression are as important at
the substance of the law establishing the restraint.
See above, p. 14-17.

'^^380 U.S.
18

479 (1965).

S

^Those two cases are Zwickler v. Koota 389 U.S. 241 (1967)
and Cameron v. Johnson 390 U.S. 611 (1968).

185

For a complete discussion of the abstention doctrine see
D'Armey Bailey, "Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions
Which Abridge First Amendment Freedoms," Harvard CivilRights-Civil Liberties Review 3 (1967), p. 67-123"
,

187

He was joined by Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Stewart and
Chief Justice Warren.

188

380 U.S. 479, 489-490 (1965)
189„
Cameron v. Johnson 390 U S 611

In Z«ickler v. Koota 389 U

xaw xni-ringes Z^TroltTl
it'lTtnlTs
on protected

S

2
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?

tu
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Cameron

°verbroad'"V:^erbroad

expression and is thereforp
void on Its face. No amount of
by the statP
courts can remove that fact even construction
if state cSurts had
never had the chance to interpret
an overbroad statute
Brennan held that it was the
responsibility
thf
f"^^
the federal
judiciary to resolve the constitutional ol'
challenges to the law when they were
presented.
190

See Note

"The Chilling Effect in Constitutional
Law
Columbia Law Review 69-2 (1969),
p. 808-842.

"

.

19LThe pertinent
section of the Mississippi law
follows:

is as
It shall be unlawful for any person,
singly or
in concert with others, to engage in
picketing or miss
demonstrations
such a manner as to obstruct or
reasonably interfere with free ingress or egress unfrom any public premises, State property, countv to and
or municipal courthouses, city halls, office buildings",
jails
^ public buildings or property owned by the State
°5 M-

m

of Mississippi, or any county or municipal government
located therein, or with the transaction of public business or administration therein or thereon conducted or so
as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free use
of
public streets, sidexN^alks, or other public wavs adjacent
or contiguous thereto.'
Miss Code Ann sect. 2318.5
(Supp 1966) quoted at 390 U.S. 611, 612 Note 1 (1968).
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379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Justice Brennan joined Justice
Goldberg's majority opinion.

Ibid.

,

p.

555.

94
'^^Ibid.

,

p.

562.

1

''-'360

U.S. 72 (1959), see above, p. 68-71.
The Cameron and
Cox cases seem to display the Supreme Court's particular
sensitivity to protest activity near courts.
But the
Court has not been as concerned about the effect demonstrators may have on the legislative process.
In
Edwards v. South Carolina 372 U.S. 229 (1963) overturned
the breach of the peace convictions of a group which had

110
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their tone is consideraMrdiff^renf
""ll ITeTalZl
leaves the State House grounds and
moves
courthouse, xt changes from an attractive ?oward^the
cerned crtizens using democratic avenues group of con
of protest on'
pablic issues to a mod, heavy with the
promise of
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196
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Those cases, and Justice Brennan's view
expressed thprpin
Beilan v. Board_of Education 357 U.S^
Lerner V. Case^ 357 U. sr-468-(T958) -a state 399 (1958rand
cannot fire
dxsloyal without utilizing procedures
wh.vr.
which insure due process; Nelson and Glove v.
County of
Los Angeles 362 U.S. 1 (19 6U) -dismissal f
o
a |^^|^^t
employee because he has claimed protection of
the Fifth
ituticnally arbitrary; Scales v. U.S.
^^frf^rSn?
367 U.S. 203 (1961)--section 4f of the Internal
Act legislates immunity from prosecution under SecuritT"
the member^^^^ °
^"^^^^ Act; Killian v. U.S. 368 U S
/li?-,?
(1961)--direct proof of the act of joinini^ required 231
before an individual can be held to be a member of
Communist Party; U.S. v. Robel 389 U.S. 258 (1967)--the
Congress had excessively delegated legislative authority
to the Secretary of Defense to designate certain
industries defense facilities.
are:

•

^^''357 U.S.

Ibid
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513 (1958)

.

526.
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The case is Keyishian v. Regents 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion.

New York Times

201
^^^Ibid.

,

v.

U.S.

403 U.S.

713 (1971).

725-726.

p.

^^^See above,

p.

16-18.

203
^" N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Lamont v.
Postmaster General 381 U.S. 301 (1965), C.B.S. v.
Democratic National Committee 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
^^'^Griswold v.
^^"^^381

U.S.

Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

301,

308 (1965).

^^^412 U.S. 94 (1973)
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^or an extensive discussion of the
rieht to acrpc;^
Jerome Barron, "Access to the Press-A
New First Lend
ment Right," Harvar d Law Review 80
(1967)
p
UaS'tr
and Jerome Bar roHT-A^TEmerging First
Amendment Riehr of
Access to the 50 Articles Midi!?," George
Jon
Law Review 37 (1969), p. 487-509.
^ wastimgton
208^
, ,
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Pa ns Adult
Theater v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49 73-114 (1^7-^^
bee above, p. 304.
.

.

,

.

210,
Justice ^Brennan s opinions in the internal security
were of considerably less significance. The commentscases
that follow should be taken to pertain primarily to
obscenity censorship and libel.
211
See above, p. 20-27.
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